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Introduction'
Many lawyers have little or no professional contact with the armed forces.
Some occasionally serve a military client in the civil courts and perhaps may even
represent clients before military agencies. On the other hand, a sizable number
of attorneys spend a portion of their professional life as temporary members of
the armed forces and gain considerable experience concerning military operations
and problems which require application of authority commonly referred to as
"military law," whether in military agencies or civil forums. Then there are also
lawyers who serve substantial numbers of years as members of the "regular" or
"reserve" (either in an active duty or inactive duty status), or those who are
employed by the federal government in a civilian capacity, each of whom by his
expertise qualifies in varying degree as a specialist in military law.
This discussion will provide an analysis of military law reflecting certain
problem areas confronted by a modern commander in the United States Army
who exercises general court-martial jurisdiction, pursuant to the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ).' By applicable regulations, such a commander
also is empowered to execute actions pursuant to authority other than that of the
UCMJ. Normally such a commander will be a general officer, though not in
every case.
The scope of "military law," as contemplated by the title, reflects a concept
posed in terms broader than customary definitions. Such definitions usually
embrace statutes expressly prescribed for the government of the military forces in
the constitutional sense,' plus customs and usages included within the body of
1 The concept of this paper derived in large measure from the Senior Officers' Legal
Orientation [hereinafter cited as SOLO], a deskbook issued by the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's School, U. S. Army, in 1971. Other basic source materials include Department of the
Army Pamphlets No. 27-19, LEGAL GUIDE FOR COMMANDERS, Mar. 1, 1972; No. 27-164,
MILITARY RESERVATIONS Oct. 8, 1965 [hereinafter cited as MILITARY RESERVATIONS]; and
No. 27-187, MILITARY AFFAIsRS, Dec. 28, 1966 [hereinafter cited as MILITTAY AFFAIRs].
2 10 U.S.C. § 822 (1970) '(art. 22 UCMJ). Though reference herein generally will be in
the context of the United States Army or the Department of the Army, many situations will
be common to the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force, as well.
3 See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, which provides that Congress shall have the power
to make rules and regulations for the government of the land and naval forces; and U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, which provides that the President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy. The constitutional authority devolves upon the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Army, and appropriate subordinate officials, as neither
the Congress nor the President individually can engage in all Army transactions. See, e.g., 10
U.S.C. §§ 133, 141, 3012 (1970). The rationale of transmitted authority is illustrated by a
case in which the Superintendent of the U. S. Military Academy executed authority expressly
vested by statute in the President. Dunmar v. Ailes, 348 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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law administered by the military establishment. "Military law" in its broader
sense is not neatly compiled and cataloged in legal indices under that title but
may be located in any of the general classifications of law. A typical and recent
example is found in the report of an action for injunctive and declaratory relief
against a governor and members of a state national guard posing a significant
issue of judicial review over executive determinations pertaining to military
forces, where neither the style of the case nor typical "key number" captions,
i.e., "Constitutional Law," "Courts," and "Homicide" (without careful reading
of the accompanying headnoted material), would normally attract attention as
precedent pertaining to fundamental problems of the military.4
For example, analysis of the Uniform Code of Military Justice may include
application of principles dealing with habeas corpus rights or other extraor-
dinary remedies which transcend the bounds of specific traditional military law.
Moreover, the composition of the modem Army includes as an auxiliary com-
ponent a substantial force of civilian employees who are not subject to UCMJ
jurisdiction but are amenable to many statutes which do not reach military
personnel and to some which do. There is also a complex of federal statutes,
such as acts dealing with Assimilative Crimes, Posse Comitatus, claims (e.g., the
Federal Tort Claims Act), and Freedom of Information, to name but a few
which encompass military operations, and even state laws (pertaining, e.g., to
wrongful death and injury, fish and game, and taxes), which may have a
special impact upon military-civilian personnel or activities of the Army, though
they are not necessarily rooted in historical military-legal traditions.
The modem Army commander therefore is well advised to become cognizant
not only of traditional military law but of any laws (including applicable case
law) which have a potential for affecting the discipline and administration of his
personnel-both military and civilian-and other persons not connected with
the military establishment who by their acts are brought within the scope of his
supervision or who are affected by military operations.5 In this regard, the com-
mander will depend largely on his legal staff to alert him to unexpected legal
involvements.
The commander's legal staff is headed by the staff judge advocate (SJA)
who, as a member of the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the Army,6 per-
4 Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1972) (a case arising out of the Kent State
disorders of May 1970).
5 Though loath deliberately to exclude any area of law having a substantial military
connotation, the author omitted consideration of martial rule-a singular nonstatutory, transi-
tory body of "law" of limited application, which depends entirely for its justification upon
public necessity of the moment (DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 19-15, CIVIL DISTUR-
BANCES (1972)). Martial rule operates only as authorized by the executive branch when civil
governmental agencies, including the courts, are unable to function freely, pending restoration
of civil authority. Blackstone's blunt notation that martial law was "built upon no settled
principles" and "is entirely arbitrary" (according to Sir Matthew Hale) may serve to place
the subject in perspective. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 413 (Cooley ed. 1899). For
other distinctions between martial rule and military law, see Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 141-42 (1866). G. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, ch. XVI 300n.1 (3d ed. 1915); W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 47,
817 (2d ed. 1920); and Wurfel, Military Government-The Supreme Court Speaks, 40 N.C.L.
REv. 717 (1962). For a general bibliography of military law, see 10 Am. CruM. L. REV. 175
(1971).
6 The early history of the Judge Advocate General's Corps is narrated in Fratcher,
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forms largely as would a corporate counsel. However, in addition to performing
general functions of a legal counsel for the commander covering the gamut of
military law problems from investigatory proceedings to procurement and taxa-
tion, and especially in executing specific statutory responsibilities under the
UCMJ, he also possesses authentic credentials as a member of the commander's
staff, fully responsible and subject to him, in a true military sense, just as any
other staff member. He may be confronted with problems which do not directly
present legal issues but may reflect policy questions or other matters within the
discretion of the commander thus permitting his broad participation in significant
activities of the command, always to be considered in the light of his primary
responsibility to ascertain immediate or potential legal implications. Beyond
that, he is subject to the technical supervision of the Judge Advocate General'
who, at the highest echelons of the Army structure, serves as legal advisor of the
Chief of Staff and members of the Army Staff and as military legal advisor to
the Secretary of the Army. Subordinate to the staff judge advocate (usually a
colonel or lieutenant colonel) are his deputy and junior members of the JAGC,
plus civilian attorneys employed by the Department, and assorted administrative
military and civilian personnel." Legal personnel are kept apprised of develop-
ments in military law by an internal educational program. In the Army, legal
training centers around the Judge Advocate General's School on the campus
of the University of Virginia at Charlottesville, which operates on a year-round
basis, offering basic, advanced, and special resident instruction and which, in
addition, maintains an active publications program.9
Finally, a brief observation is warranted on the state of judicial review vis-A-
vis the military. Legal proceedings challenging military authority historically
were not enthusiastically embraced by courts in matters related to discretion law-
fully committed to the military.1 ° More recently, traditional judicial forbearance
History of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army, 4 Ms.rrARY L. Rxv. 89
(1959).
7 Ouinions of the Judge Advocate General frequently are cited by the courts under the
rule which attributes considerable significance to administrative views concerning matters com-
mitted to agency discretion.
8 The historic term "judge advocate" may be traced back at least to the British Articles
of War of the seventeenth century. Known in the English military law as "judge-martial"
(sometimes "-marshal"), the prefix "judge" derived in part from certain judicial respon-
sibilities, as distinguished from functions as prosecutor or legal advisor. The Schultheiss and
Auditeur of the early German military law reflect additional multiple legal responsibilities. W.
WINTHRop, supra note 5, at 179.
9 A comprehensive review of internal continuing legal education conducted by the armed
services appears in the article by Douglass & Workman, The Educational Program for the
Service Lawyer, 31 FED. B. J. 7 (1972).
10 Hence the broad brush of abstention reflected by illustrative cases: Martin v. Mott, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 12 (1827) ("Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person
.. the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge ... ." Id. at 19); United States v.
Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 184 (1842) (acts of the President, through the Secretary of War, are
"binding upon all within the sphere of his legal and constitutional authority." Id. at 191);
Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911) ("To those in the military... the military law is
due process" Id. at 304); and Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) ("judges are not
given the task of running the Army." Id. at 93). In a 1962 lecture, Chief Justice Warren
recognized the national tradition supporting the military establishment's broad power to deal
with its personnel since the "courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline
that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have," nevertheless asserting that
passing events have "required a modification in the traditional theory of the autonomy of




has seemed to wane at least to the extent of requiring closer examination of the
asserted basis for military action." Nevertheless, attacks on the validity of in-
ternal military transactions are not likely to invite intimate judicial scrutiny
absent evidence either of substantial failure to adhere to prescribed regulatory
procedures or significant abuse of discretion in the application of such pro-
cedures.'
It is hoped that the following discussion will afford a measure of familiarity,
especially for those whose professional military contacts are limited, with an area
of jurisprudence that is assuming greater proportions than perhaps is supposed by
many. Of even greater importance, however, is the possibility that the presenta-
tion will encourage, particularly among those already conversant with military
law, more legal writing in greater depth than can be accomplished in this paper
on the various subjects covered as well as the many facets of military law that
could not be reached in this article.
I. Civil
A. Military Reservations
1. Authority, Ownership, and Jurisdiction
"Command" of a military installation (e.g., fort, reservation, camp, base,
depot, arsenal, station, or activity) normally is the responsibility of the senior
assigned officer. Such command is distinguishable from the unique disciplinary
authority of an officer over troops in his charge. For the purposes of this chapter,
the term refers more particularly to the commander's responsibility as a general
manager of land, buildings and equipment, personnel, and related activities. In
this capacity, his function is analogous to that of the governing official of a city
or the superintendent of a large commercial plant or facility.
The nature of the post commander's authority is directly related to the extent
that the federal government exercises "jurisdiction" over the land area involved.
Jurisdiction, in this sense, refers to the congressional authority to legislate within
such area, as distinguished from the power of Congress to legislate on subject
matter and purpose predicated upon some specific grant in the constitution. Also
jurisdiction, as used here, is distinguished from mere federal ownership of land.
The inherent power of a post commander to control entry upon a military
post13 arises pursuant to earlier mentioned constitutional authority, as well as
customs and usages essential to the mission and purposes of the military establish-
11 The trend can be traced to cases such as Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) and
Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
12 Subjective factors recently suggested include: (1) nature and strength of challenge
to military determination, (2) potential injury to plaintiff, (3) type and degree of anticipated
interference with the military function, and (4) extent to which the exercise of military
expertise or discretion is involved. Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1971).
For a recent instance where such discretion was not abused, see Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, sub noma. Cortright v. Froehlke, 405 U.S. 965 (1972).
13 See, e.g., 3 Op. AT'VY GEN. 268 '(1837); 9 Op. ATVr'Y GEN. 106 (1857); Op. ATT'Y
GEN. 476 (1860).
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ment. Though normally implemented by departmental policy and local rules,
that power has in a number of instances been fortified by statute.:"
As inevitably will be true with other topics to be considered in the balance
of this article, principles of constitutional and administrative law, together with
many fields of substantive law (e.g., as to this chapter, real property law) are ap-
plicable to the law pertaining particularly to military reservations.
Acquisition of real property for military use is subject to the discretion of
the Congress,1" and therefore must be authorized by statute. 6 Similarly statutory
authorization is required for military construction on acquired property, though
not necessarily in specific terms for each project.
When the United States acquires title to land, the Government obtains the
normal rights which appertain thereto as in the case of a private landowner.
However, title runs to the United States rather than to the agency using it, though
control rests with a particular department or agency. Large military sites usually
are the result of acquisition of separate parcels or tracts from different owners, by
different methods, at different times. As a consequence, applicable substantive
legal principles can vary from tract to tract, though appearance may belie
the heterogeneous nature of a given military site.
As indicated previously, "jurisdiction," as used here, refers to the power of
the Congress to enact general legislation applying within the land area in-
volved."7 Such jurisdiction may be exercised even over land the Government does
not own, as in the case of privately owned land included in an area as to which
a state cedes jurisdiction to the United States. Conversely, the federal govern-
ment owns much land over which the United States exercises no jurisdiction. In
such circumstances, the federal government is said to have only a proprietorial
interest.
The three most commonly used jurisdictional terms as applied to the United
States Government are summarized as follows:
a. Exclusive legislative jurisdiction-The United States retains all
authority to legislate, though a state may have retained the right to
serve process concerning off-post activities and in addition may exercise
authority pursuant to federal statutes permitting it to do so.:"
b. Concurrent legislative jurisdiction-The state retains the right,
concurrently with the United States, to exercise all authority to legislate.
c. Partial legislative jurisdiction-The United States has been
granted power to exercise only a portion of the state's authority.
14 Specific statutes will be cited in context, supra, with the subjects to which they pertain.
15 Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 154 (1886).
16 E.g., 41 U.S.C. § 14 (1970); 10 U.S.C. § 2676 (1970).
17 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
18 Federal legislative jurisdiction arises from the constitutional provision ascribing congres-
sional power to legislate over the areas acquired from the States for the "Seat of the Govern-
ment" and "Forts . . . and other needful Buildings." The absence of federal legislative juris-
diction does not mean that federal agencies are powerless to carry out in the area the functions
assigned to them under the constitution and statutes, since authority exists independent of the
power to legislate over federal areas. See REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE




Federal legislative jurisdiction arises from the constitutional provision which
pertains to the "Seat of the Government" and other places acquired from the
states for specified government purposes.'9
Specific statutes provide directly for the punishment of major crimes com-
mitted in areas under federal exclusive jurisdiction" and indirectly by the
Assimilative Crimes Act which makes the criminal law of a surrounding state
applicable to federal areas therein as federal criminal law.2
In an early case, the Supreme Court held that the power of exclusive legisla-
tion in a specific area includes incidental powers necessary to the complete and
effectual execution of the power of exclusive legislation and therefore the United
States may punish a person, not a resident of the federal area, for concealment of
his knowledge concerning a crime committed within the federal area.2
An important judicial precedent in 1885 expanded the doctrine of federal
legislative jurisdiction to include acquisition of federal jurisdiction by cession
from the state and by reservation when a state is admitted to the Union, in ad-
dition to the constitutional method involving purchase with the consent of the
state.23 That case also recognized the right of the ceding state to reserve certain
powers not inconsistent with free and effective use of the property for federal
purposes. The right to attach such reservation also is applicable to consent
statutes.2" The cession doctrine also has been interpreted to permit consensual
acquisition of federal legislative control over federal land originally acquired for
purposes other than those enumerated under the provision for legislative jurisdic-
tion in federal areas.25
Formal acceptance of jurisdiction by the United States has been required by
force of statute since 1 February 194'26 Inconsistencies between state consent
and cession statutes may cause problems in determining the status of specific land
parcels. In one illustrative case, the Supreme Court determined that the United
States could elect whether to proceed under a state consent or cession statute2?
and, in another, jurisdiction was acquired on the theory that a subsequent state
consent statute impliedly repealed an earlier cession law which included certain
conditions which were not fulfilled in the particular transaction. '
The concept of federal legislative jurisdiction over a federal enclave does
not preclude readjustment of political boundaries affecting the federal area within
the state, as in the case of annexation by a political subdivision of lands formally
acquired by the federal government for military purposes. 29
19 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
20 Various derivations of the Federal Crimes Act of 1790 now are codified in Title 18.
Though mention of criminal statutes in a section devoted to civil law may seem misplaced, the
succeeding criminal law portion (Part II) will deal essentially with military criminal law.
21 Originally enacted in 1825, the statute now appears at 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
22 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 120, 191-92 (1821), and MILrrARY RESERVA-
TIONS, supra note 1, at 23.
23 Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
24 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
25 Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528 (1938).
26 See 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1970).
27 Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 268 (1963).
28 United States v. Lovely, 319 F.2d 673 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 913 (1963).
29 Howard v. Commissioners, 344 U.S. 624 (1953). See also, Hammack, Annexation of
Military Reservations by Political Subdivisions, 11 MiLrrARY L. Rav. 99 (1961).
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As indicated, when property is under exclusive, concurrent, or partial fed-
eral legislative jurisdiction, federal law will apply to the extent precluded by a
state reservation of authority provided that the state law does not interfere un-
reasonably with a federal activity.30 Federal statutes have been enacted to adopt
state principles as federal law or to apply state law as such in areas as to which
federal legislative jurisdiction exists. Among such statutes are those pertaining
to state laws concerning wrongful death and injury,s" fish and game, 2 workmen's
and unemployment compensation, 3 quarantine and health, 4 gasoline taxes,"'
general sales and use taxes,a income taxes,' and taxation of leasehold interests in
federal property3 s
Many areas of law are not covered by specific statutes such as those men-
tioned. Such uncovered fields include contracts, sales, agency, probate and ad-
ministration actions, guardianship, and domestic relations.39 Under such cir-
cumstances, complex problems may arise in attempts to ascertain what law is
applicable.
Customarily when legislative power over an area is transferred to another
sovereign, the laws of the previous sovereign in effect at the time of transfer con-
tinue in force until changed by the new government.4" However, in some cases
it becomes extremely difficult to apply this principle, especially when the law of
the other sovereign changes substantially over the years."
A somewhat analogous problem exists in the application of the Assimilative
Crimes Act." An example of this kind of problem is found when the Act is used
in connection with traffic offenses in a federal area, when the state law to be
assimilated applies to "public highways" or similar state facilities.'
Rights and benefits of state residents sometimes are difficult to translate in
terms of residents of federal enclaves, though a succession of federal statutes and
30 MIITARYx RESERVATIONS, supra note 1, at 56. The latter proviso is based on the fed-
eral immunity or supremacy doctrine enunciated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
159 (1819). The doctrine serves to protect federal land as well as federal activities (on and
off federal land) from state control. See Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525(1885). "Activities" extend to acts done within the scope of federal employment, thus pre-
cluding criminal sanctions for such acts. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). In addition, fed-
eral statutes authorize removal to federal courts of state criminal prosecutions against federal
personnel for acts within the performance of their duties, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a (1970).
31 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1970).
32 10 U.S.C. § 2671 (1970).
33 40 U.S.C. § 290 (1970); 26 U.S.C. § 3305(d) (1970).
34 42 U.S.C. § 97 (1970).
35 4 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
36 4 U.S.C. § 105 (1970).
37 4 U.S.C. § 106 (1970).
38 10 U.S.C. § 2667(e) (1970).
39 MILITARY RESERVATIONS, supra note 1, at 59. See use of habeas corpus by a federal
court to return to a father two children removed by the mother (in violation of a North
Carolina divorce decree) to Fort Knox, a federal military reservation as to which Kentucky had
ceded jurisdiction to the United States, in Young v. Minton, 344 F. Supp. 423 (W.D.Ky. 1972).
40 See, e.g., Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542 (1885).
41 This circumstance is considered in MILITARY RESERVATIONS, supra note 1, at 59-62.
42 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970). The history and constitutionality of this statute are con-
sidered in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 '(1958).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Barner, 195 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. Cal. 1961); see also, Opinion
of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, Op. JAGA 1969/4557, 70-2 JuDGE
ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICE 21. Another typical adaption problem appears in Air Terminal
Services v. Rentzel, 81 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1949); See generally MILrrARY RESERVATIONS,
supra note 1, at 63-65.
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at least one recent Supreme Court decision on voting rights appear to be re-
versing an early view precluding extension of state laws into lands under exclusive
federal legislative jurisdiction." In addition to suffrage matters, problems in this
area extend to qualifications for holding office, relief benefits, education, and
other matters involving questions of domicile."
Particular procedural problems may be encountered in determining the
availability of a judicial forum for a cause of action arising in an area under
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Transitory actions (e.g., contract matters) may be
brought in any state court having jurisdiction over the adverse party, as well as
in a federal court (since federal law will apply) if federal monetary jurisdictional
requirements are met. On the other hand, local actions must be enforced in a
court having physical jurisdiction over the person, res, or, in some instances, the
place where the cause arose (e.g., in rem procedings). Federal courts do not
have jurisdiction in many types of local in rem actions. A state court accepting
jurisdiction of an action arising in a federal enclave is limited in authority only
insofar as its action would materially interfere with a federal function."
2. The Post Commander
a. General Management
The officer in charge of a military installation is more than a commander
of troops committed to his charge and director of other personnel under his
supervision. By virtue of his assignment he assumes general managerial respon-
sibility for all government activity at the site. Except as to a few particular mat-
ters, his actions generally must find legal basis in departmental policy directives or
customs and usages of the service, as implemented or modified by intermediate
commanders and as construed by officials having responsibility therefor."' His
responsibilities extend not only to the land, buildings, and equipment, but also
to the preservation of peace, rules governing entry, regulation of traffic, firearms,
solicitors and other visitors, including those invited for social occasions or with
respect to activities open to the general public.48
b. Denial of Entry
In this important aspect of post administration federal statutes fortify the
long-recognized authority of a post commander to control the entry of persons
upon, and exit from, an installation and the search of persons and their posses-
sions. 9 The thrust of the general and statutory authority provided the frame-
44 Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
45 See MILITARY RESERVATIONS, supra note 1, at 48-53.
46 Id. at 52-53; Lyle v. Kincaid, 344 F. Supp. 223 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
47 Authority in certain situations may be related to statutory provisions contained in
the UCMJ, as when a commander exercising court-martial jurisdiction thereunder may, by
reason of other directives, be authorized to discharge military personnel or perform other
administrative acts.
48 The regulatory requirements are prescribed in applicable departmental regulations.
49 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970) makes punishable (1) entry upon a military site "for
any purpose prohibited by law or lawful regulation" or '(2) reentry after having been removed
[February, 1973]
MILITARY LAW, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
work for the development and recent reaffirmation of a significant segment of
military law affecting military reservations. In 1961 the Supreme Court affirmed
summary exclusion from a military installation of a civilian employee for reasons
of security."0 During the latter part of the ensuing decade, numerous attempts
were made to challenge the post commander's authority by persons desiring to
come upon military bases to articulate and demonstrate antiwar sentiments
under the color of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and
assembly. Though some judicial determinations partially penetrated the limits
of traditional military authority in the premises, the resulting litigation generally
reemphasized judicial acknowledgment of the post commander's authority to take
appropriate reasonable measures against intrusions inconsistent with the nature
and purposes of a military installation.5
As previously indicated, the post commander has broad responsibilities in
control of the installation. He has a corollary power that has provoked some
criticism but which has been upheld judicially relative to the search of in-
dividuals who enter his domain. The power to search an individual under mili-
tary authority may be exercised only upon probable cause or because of military
necessity. Beyond that a person who declines to permit search of his person or
vehicle may be denied the right of entry to the premises. A search valid under
military law is valid for purposes of prosecution in the civil courts.5 2 The courts
have recognized the general proposition that military personnel as well as others
who enter a military reservation surrender some of their individual rights so that
military discipline and security may remain inviolate.5" In particular, military
precedents empower the commanding officer to authorize a search of either mil-
itary or civilian quarters on post.5
c. Motor Vehicles
The regulation of privately owned motor vehicle operations on post is an
or ordered not to reenter by the officer in charge. 50 U.S.C. § 797(a) (1970) authorizes
punishment upon conviction of willful violation of directives pertaining to areas specially
restricted for security reasons.
50 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
51 See, e.g., Dash v. Commanding General, 429 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 981 (1971); Schneider v. Laird, 453 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
914 (1972); Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964: (E.D.N.C. 1972). Late in the 1971-72 session,
the Supreme Court summarily reversed, per curiam, a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1382
of prohibited reentry on a thoroughfare running through Fort Sam Houston, Texas, for
the purpose of peaceful distribution of leaflets promoting an off-post antiwar rally. Flower
v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972), It appears that Flower probably will be limited to
the factual circumstances of the case. Ten days later, the Court upheld the right of a pri-
vately owned shopping center to bar distribution of handbills unrelated to the center's opera-
tions. Lloyd Corporation, Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). The subject is treated
more fully in Gerwig, Military Reservations: Forts or Parks? 12 Wm. & MARY L. Rnv. 51
(1970) and Gerwig, The Post Commander Goes to Court, 31 FED. B.J. 33 (1972). Cf.. the
rule for a public office building, e.g., the Pentagon, where building administrators were not
permitted to discriminate in granting public use of the building's concourse between groups
or persons favoring and opposing government policies. United States v. Crowthers, No. 71-
1313 (4th Cir. Mar. 20, 1972).
52 United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v. Crowley,
9 F.2d 927 (N.D. Ga. 1922).
53 United States v. Miller, 261 F. Supp. 442 (D. Del. 1966).
54 MILrrARY REsERVATIONS, supra note 1, at 77.
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area in which the post commander also exercises broad authority, extending
from traffic rules to registration requirements for vehicles of personnel quartered
or employed at or regularly visiting the site. Regulations may, in fact, condition
registration upon liability insurance and safety requirements. Overall, reason-
ableness is the test that must characterize regulatory control of the motor vehicle
traffic system.
d. Public Quarters
The post commander's broad authority runs also to the management of
government quarters, including assignment, termination, and lease under certain
conditions. The measure here is the best interests of the service, which usually
translates into conservation of public funds through maximum use of public
housing. Quarters may be terminated under applicable regulations for miscon-
duct of the military sponsor or dependents involving misuse or illegal use of
quarters, or other misconduct, contrary to safety, health, and morals. The post
commander's broad control was evidenced recently when a federal district judge
dismissed an action by a sergeant to prevent eviction of himself and his family
from government housing after he had been directed to vacate the quarters be-
cause of misconduct on the part of a dependent minor stepson.5
e. Law Enforcement
In maintaining law and order, an installation commander's authority to
enforce military law against military personnel is unquestioned, vested as it is
under the UCMJ. Conversely, the enforcement of nonmilitary criminal law
poses problems at the very outset of state or federal jurisdiction. When exclusive
federal jurisdiction exists, it is likely that only serious crimes will be prosecuted
because of the need for active support by federal law enforcement officials,
except insofar as minor offenses may be referred to a federal magistrate for dis-
position.56
The commander's main police arm to enforce law and order is his military
organization. However, the Posse Comitatus Act" prohibits, except in cases
expressly authorized by the Constitution or federal statutes, use of the Army in
enforcement of either state or federal law. Although litigation under the Act is
rare, at least one recent application, in bar of a claim against the government,
attests to the statute's viability.5" Normally, a person not subject to military
law may be apprehended on post only for a felony or a misdemeanor amounting
to a breach of the peace (under the theory of "citizen arrest," subject to appli-
55 Hines v. Seaman, 305 F. Supp. 564 (D. Mass. 1969).
56 See Franks, Prosecution in Civil Courts of Minor Offenses Committed on Military In-
stallations, 51 MIrrARY L. Rav. 85 (1971); Lloyd, Unlawful Entry and Re-entry into Mili-
tary Reservations in Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1382, 53 MILITARY L. Rav. 137 (1971).
57 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970). See Furman, Restrictions Upon Use of the Army Imposed
by the Posse Comitatus Act, 7 MILITARY L. REV. 85 (1960).
58 In Wrynn v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), the case turned in
favor of the Government on proof that an Air Force helicopter which injured the plaintiff
was used in violation of the Act and that such unauthorized use could not subject the United
States to tort liability.
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cable civil law). However, a commander may use such force as is necessary to
protect a military reservation from occupation or injury by trespassers. 59
f. Release of Information
Because he is the custodian of Army records, the post commander is one of
several classes of officials empowered to furnish access to, or copies of, military
records under his supervision, in accordance with applicable regulations pur-
suant to the Freedom of Information Act. 0 The Act provides for compulsory
disclosure of federal agency records (including those of the military departments)
not included in classes of records specifically exempted from release. Major per-
tinent exemptions pertain to defense or foreign affairs where secrecy is required
by executive order, internal agency personnel matters, materials exempted from
disclosure by statute, internal memorandums unavailable to a party in litigation
with the agency,"' personnel files whose disclosure might cause unwarranted
invasion of privacy, and certain investigatory files. Consistent with the con-
gressional purpose, Army policy provides that maximum information shall be
made available upon request, subject to the statutory exemptions (though the
exemptions are not to be employed "if no legitimate purpose exists" for with-
holding the requested information) .6 The military administrative procedures
contain provisions for appealing to departmental levels actions in which sub-
ordinate commanders have denied access.
The courts have not been unmindful of the interests of national defense.63
On the other hand, clear implications of the recent New York Times and Wash-
ington Post newspaper cases involving publication of the "Pentagon Papers"
indicate that the Government bears a heavy burden in establishing an immediate
grave danger to the national interest, at least for the purposes of restraining
private publication of news based on classified information.m " Recently, however,
an ex parte inspection by the judge was found to be unnecessary in order for
a district court to grant the government's motion for summary judgment uphold-
ing the classification of a portion of the Pentagon Papers. 5
59 9 Op. A7rr'y GEN. 106 (1857); Peck, The Use of Force to Protect Government Prop-
erty, 26 MmiLTARY L. Iv. 81 (1964). Other early opinions indicated the view that if a
federal official authorized to commit persons to federal custody were not accessible to the
post commander, the latter could detain an offender but not for purposes of punishment and
in any event only for such interval as might be necessary to effect disposition to federal civil
authorities, e.g., Dix Ops JAG 146 (1901).
60 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). The Act amended section 3 of the Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946 ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (formerly 5 U.S.C. § 1002), which in turn derived from
R.S. § 161, the "housekeeping statute," tracing back to the Act of July 27, 1789, ch. IV
§ 4, 1 Stat. 28.
61 Purely factual material is generally discoverable under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
26(b) and would not be protected from disclosure, as distinguished from advice, recommenda-
tions, opinions, and other subjective material. See, e.g., Wu v. National Endowment for
Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1972).
62 Army Reg. 345-20 (1967).
63 See, e.g., Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965(1970). Other illustrative cases include United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) and
Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
64 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). The Act was not men-
tioned in the several opinions; in fact, the Chief Justice intimated the absence of any relevant
statute.
65 Moss v. Laird, 72-3 JUDo ADvoCATE LEGAL SRvicE 8 (D.D.C. 1971).
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Typical instances of matter released by the Army on an ad hoc basis
(though potentially privileged under the Act's exemption of certain investi-
gatory files), include portions of a military aircraft accident file not containing
testimony of manufacturers and their technicians (assuming security considera-
tions do not preclude such disclosure), a criminal investigation file (except close-
up photographs of a murder victim), military police traffic accident investigation
forms (with a caveat for opinions or conclusions contained therein), summary
of evidence from an inspector general's report, report of investigation under
article 32 of the UGMJ, and investigatory files for use in civil domestic relations
proceedings. 6
On the other hand, release of blood samples taken by service members from
other service members for use of civilian law enforcement officials would violate
the Posse Comitatus Act.6 7 However, records of blood and urine samples taken
at an Army hospital for diagnosis and treatment were exempt from mandatory
release provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, though release when re-
quired by state law or pursuant to court order was legally unobjectionable."
g. "Off Limits" and Miscellaneous Matters
An important power of the post commander is his authority, subject to
specific regulations, to declare "off-limits" to his personnel such off-post estab-
lishments as are regarded dangerous to the health, morals, and welfare of his
troops. This power represents an extension of the commander's authority be-
yond the premises of the reservation. Nevertheless, where "off-limits" policy
signifies a standard of reasonableness, it has been staunchly upheld in the civil
courts against the challenge of abuse of discretion. 9 Other instances of the
off-post impact of military authority usually implemented through post com-
manders are found in statutes authorizing measures to suppress prostitution"0
and to regulate sale and use of intoxicating liquors."1
Other aspects of an installation commander's power which entail legal
implications include such matters as disposal and granting use of military real
property2 and the investigation of on-post deaths and disposition of effects of
deceased persons found in a federal enclave.7 ' Beyond these there are still other
powers exercised by a post commander that relate primarily to administrative
66 Sherwood, The Freedom of Information Act: A Compendium for the Military Lawyer
52 MILITARY L. REV. 103, 132-33 (1971).
67 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970); Op JAGA 1968/4228; 68-26 JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL
SERVICE 12.
68 Op JAGA 1971/4809, 2 THE ARMy LAWYER Jan. 1972, at 31.
69 Harper v. Jones, 195 F.2d 705 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 821 (1952), Ains-
worth v. Barn Ballroom Co., 157 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1946); MILITARY RESERVATIONS, supra
note 1, at 91.
70 18 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970).
71 50 U.S.C. App. § 473 (1970). See also commentary under "Miscellaneous Organiza-
tions," ante.
72 MILITARY RESERVATIONS, supra note 1, at 100. Generally, the commander's authority
is limited to licenses of a minor character, such as permission to enter for bus and taxi ser-
vice, for commercial deliveries, permission for government contractors for purposes consistent
with contractual provisions and assignment of space for banking facilities and other private
enterprises.
73 10 U.S.C. §§ 4711-12 (1970).
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matters without significant regard for legislative jurisdiction or other factors
germane to the land area involved, though their impact may have important
legal connotations.
Aspects of installation management patently cover myriad circumstances
which are not susceptible to convenient classification in a discussion of limited
proportions. However, the propensity for spawning administrative regulations
that inhere in governmental agencies provides, for the military departments, a
voluminous library of remarkably assorted policy directives, regulations and other
memoranda for those interested in isolating applicable policy on a given function
germane to the operation of a military reservation. 4
B. Administrative Discharge for Military Personnel
Personnel administration encompasses an important portion of military law
and is probably the progenitor of more litigation against the United States than
any other segment of the military environment. This should not be surprising,
for the myriad aspects of personnel administration (which covers such matters
as pay, promotion, reduction, leave, assignment or transfer, and retirement, to
name but a few) produce an unmistakable personal impact. When that impact
is adverse, reaction is apt to be sharp-and may well trigger legal action chal-
lenging validity of unfavorable orders. It is in the light of potential litigation
that the subject of administrative discharges (distinguished from punitive dis-
charges pursuant to court-martial proceedings under the UCMJ) will be isolated
from the pervasive area of personnel administration, to illustrate a major sub-
division of military law.
1. Enlisted personnel
It is required by statute that each lawfully inducted or enlisted member be
given a discharge certificate upon his "discharge." If this occurs before a normal
term of service expires, the discharge must be as prescribed by the Secretary of
the Army, by sentence of a general or special court-martial, or as otherwise pro-
vided by law. 5 Detailed procedures are published in departmental regulations.
Though serious offenses generally are disposed of under the UCMJ, mis-
74 Those having a clear public impact normally can be found in the Code of Federal
Regulations or its daily component, the Federal Register. A subject of rapidly increasing legal
implications concerns environmental protection. Reported decisions appear to be tentative
and exploratory, and much more can be expected in this area. See, e.g., McQueary v. Laird,
449 F.2d 608 (10th (ir. 1971); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783
(D. Maine 1972); Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1971), and Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971); cases cited note 202
infra. See also Cundick, Army Nerve Gas Dumping: International Atropine, 56 MLITARY
L. R-v. 165 (1972), and Kirchner, The Law of Environmental Responsibility: A New Task
for the Army Lawyer, May, 1972 (unpublished thesis for TJAG School, U.S. Army). A
military comment preceding the recent surge of concern in matters ecological is found in
Sewell, Military Installations: Recent Legal Developments, 11 IILITARY L. REV. 201, 211
(1961), pointing to probable legislation affecting use and management of water resources.
And, for consideration of early cases pertaining to pollution and other impact on navigable
waters, see DEP'T oF TnE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-164 paras. 111-12 (1961).
75 10 U.S.C. § 1169 (1970).
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conduct of a lesser nature may provide a basis under secretarial authority for
administrative discharge characterized, according to the circumstances, as (1)
honorable, (2) general-under honorable conditions, and (3) undesirable-
under conditions other than honorable." Discharges under conditions other
than honorable may be directed only by commanders exercising general court-
martial jurisdiction, while other forms of discharge customarily are issued by
commanders exercising special court-martial authority. Undesirable discharges
may result in the loss of otherwise potential veterans' benefits under federal or
state law and may have an unfavorable impact on potential civil employment.
Judicial reaction has been less than unanimous in assessing the derogatory im-
plications of general and undesirable discharges, varying from clearly "stig-
matizing"77 to no connotation of dishonor in a general discharge (which ex-
pressly recites that it is under honorable conditions)."
Misconduct for these purposes may be evidenced by frequent minor offenses
(including acts violative of civil authority)," sexual perversion, drug abuse,"0
shirking of duty, failure to pay valid debts or to support dependents, and in-
service homosexual acts. In addition, regulations authorize discharge for mis-
conduct based on evidence of conviction (or adjudication as a juvenile offender)
by a civil court for specified offenses.'s Further, a discharge may be granted for
fraudulent enlistment, or in lieu of trial by court-martial for an offense war-
ranting a punitive (bad conduct or dishonorable) discharge pursuant to the
UcMJ.
Discharge also is authorized (but only under the classification of honorable
or general) for unsuitability (usually cases of inaptitude), hardship and depend-
ency conditions at home when other temporary measures are not appropriate,
convenience of the Government, conscientious objection, and minority.
Ordinarily an enlisted respondent is entitled to resist involuntary discharge
action by electing to appear before a board of officers. This option does not
apply to proceedings in lieu of trial, nor does he have the right personally to
appear before a board if in civil confinement. Correlative rights include entitle-
ment to advice by a military lawyer,82 representation by military counsel, 3 em-
ployment by him of civilian counsel, as well as customary rights of respondents
76 Type of discharge is to be determined solely by the soldier's military record. Harmon
v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958). Uniform standards and procedures appear at 32 C.F.R.
§ 41 (1972).
77 See Van Bourg v. Nitze, 388 F.2d 557, 559 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Bland v. Connally,
293 F.2d 852, 853n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
78 Ives v. Franke, 271 F.2d 469, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1959); see Denton v. Seamans, 315
F. Supp. 279, 281 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
79 The O'Callahan doctrine of service-connection, a prerequisite to court-martial juris-
diction, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), see Part II, ante, is regarded as non-
applicable to military administrative proceedings. Op JAGA 1970/3520, 70-5 JuDGE ADVOCATE
LEGAL SERVICE 18 (citing earlier unpublished opinions).
80 Recent special policies barred discharges under less than honorable conditions for
persons volunteering for treatment of drug problems.
81 Such discharge is not a denial of due process, Davis v. Secretary of the Army, 440
F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1971).
82 This provision contemplates preliminary advice pertaining to his overall rights.
83 Legal counsel is furnished only if reasonably available; if not a lawyer, counsel must
be an experienced officer of mature judgment, fully aware of his responsibilities, cf. Gastall
v. Resor, 334 F. Supp. 271 (D. Mass. 1971).
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before military boards to challenge board members for cause, to call witnesses,
to submit evidence, and to remain silent or to testify as desired. However, the
failure of an administrative discharge board to observe strict rules of evidence
does not necessarily deny due process."
2. Minors
Provision is made for discharge because of minority in the light of statutory
provisions which bar enlistment of males less than 17 years of age (females, 18)
or less than 18 (females, 21) without written consent of parents or guardian, if
any, and involuntary induction below the age of 18r/2.8 A minor who is dis-
covered enlisted or voluntarily inducted under the specified age limits and who
has not attained the statutory age is not discharged (because such enlistment is
void) but is released from military control by reason of minority. A person who
enlisted or was voluntarily inducted without parental or guardian consent when
such consent was required will be discharged upon timely application of the
parent or guardian and presentation of satisfactory evidence of the date of his
birth. A nonconsenting parent may request discharge (when there is no evidence
of legal separation or divorce from the consenting spouse).' And, a minor who
enlisted at 17 without consent must be discharged if his parents request his re-
lease before his 18th birthday even though he attains age 18 before discharge is
accomplished." Where the request by parents for release of a member who
enlisted between 17 and 18 without consent is not made until after commission
of a serious court-martial offense, the offending member may be retained in
service for disposition under the UCMJ.8
3. Officers
Numerous statutes govern the discharge of officers required to show cause
for retention because of either lack of proficiency or moral or professional derelic-
tion (including acts or behavior inconsistent with interests of national security).90
Grounds relating to substandard performance may not, before a single board, be
joined with allegations relating to moral or professional dereliction.91 Under
implementing regulations, the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction
has primary responsibility for the initial file which is forwarded to a depart-
84 Cf. Pickell v. Reed, 446 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1971). For a recent consideration of
proposed legislative reform, see Lane, Evidence and the Administrative Discharge Board, 55
MLITARY L. REv. 95 (1972).
85 10 U.S.C. §§ 505, 1170 (1970). Constitutionality of the requirement for parental
consent in the case of females (10 U.S.C. § 505) was recently challenged by an 18-year-old
female on the basis of discrimination favoring males. Howard v. United States, Civ. Act.
16834 (N.D. Ga., filed July 7, 1972).
86 50 U.S.C. App. § 454(a) (1970); Army Reg. 635-200, ch. 7.
87 Op JAGA 1967/3352, 68-8 Jma . ADvocAT LEGAL SERvICz 20.
88 Op JAGA 1966/4241, 67-27 Junon ADvocATz LEGAL SERvICE 25-26.
89 United States v. Bean, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 203, 32 C.M.R. 203 (1962) (citing, inter alia,
Barrett v. Looney, 252 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 940 (1958)). See
also Stubbs, Children and Courts-Martial, 7 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 73 (1970).
90 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 3781-87, 3791-97 (1970) (pertaining to discharge of officers on
active duty for the stated reasons).
91 Op JAGA 1968/3589, 68-12 JuDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICE 17.
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mental selection board. If the officer is required to show cause for retention,
the case is referred to the major commander concerned for processing, who will
convene a board of inquiry when such proceedings are not waived. If the board
recommends elimination, the convening authority returns the file to the De-
partment along with his recommendation regarding review by another board
and final action by the Secretary. Military lawyers are assigned (as nonvoting
members) to such boards in the capacities of (1) legal advisor to the board,
(2) recorder of the board, and (3) respondent's counsel. Respondent also may
retain civilian counsel at his own expense, have access to all evidence referred
to the board (except as may be inconsistent with security matters), and avail
himself of the usual entitlements of respondents before military boards.
4. Conscientious objectors
Excused by statutory provision from service in the armed forces are those
persons who are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form
"by reason of religious training and belief." 2 Under a Supreme Court interpre-
tation,93 the statutory requirement now seems to be capable of fulfillment by
asserted conscientious objection predicated on moral, ethical, or religious beliefs
which embrace war in any form. A cognizable "religious belief" under the
statute can be "a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying
for the exemption."94 The burden of proof initially is on the registrant to
establish a prima facie case of entitlement to the exemption. However, the bur-
den then shifts, under the familiar Estep basis-in-fact test established in 1946"5
by which the Government must cite some affirmative factual basis to justify its
position.96 Although the rule may be simply stated, it nevertheless poses the
inevitable problem of what really constitutes adequate basis in fact, e.g., does
application of the rule rest on particular findings by administrative officials, or
on the record as a whole?97
Under this statutory-judicial background, it has been determined that while
sincere beliefs founded on basic tenets of a "religion" are judicially acceptable,98
objection to a particular war (though religious and sincere), as against war in
general, will not meet the prescribed statutory test.99 As for a registrant whose
antiwar beliefs crystallize after receiving his induction notice he may be assigned
92 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1970).
93 Including, inter alia, United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
94 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
95 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
96 Examples of "no-basis" include Packard v. Rollins, 422 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1970)
and Hammond v. Lenfast, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968), while an adequate basis for the
government position was shown in Speer v. Hedrick, 419 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1969), and
Silverthorne v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 443 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1972).
"Depth of conviction" or "depth and maturity of views" tests applied by the military were
regarded as implicit findings of insincerity and were recently rejected in favor of the tests
stated in text. Kemp v. Bradley, 457 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1972).
97 See Chief Judge Aldrich's dissent in Armstrong v. Laird, 456 F.2d 521, 523-26 (1st
Cir. 1972).
98 As, e.g., in Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
99 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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duties which conflict not more than minimally with his asserted beliefs while
awaiting a hearing under Army procedures and during the pendency of deci-
sion."'0 In a somewhat different setting, the pendency of court-martial pro-
ceedings against a soldier whose application for discharge had previously been
denied did not bar his application for habeas corpus challenging the validity of
the military determination concerning his claim of conscientious objection. 10
With regard to administrative procedure, a military review board's failure
to follow what the court construed as procedure required by departmental regula-
tions was held to constitute denial of military due process." In another case,
a hearing officer prescribed by departmental conscientious objector procedures
who was not "knowledgeable in policy and procedures" relative to the subject
matter lacked required objectivity and therefore the court sent the case back to
the Army for corrective action."'
On the other hand, a military tribunal determined that an accused before
a court-martial could not interpose as a defense in his trial evidence that his
request for discharge as a conscientious objector was erroneously denied, though
the court did not decide whether it could afford relief upon direct application.'
5. Limitations
Under applicable regulations and subject to certain exceptions relating
to new evidence or subsequent misconduct, and without departmental approval,
no person may be considered for elimination because of conduct which was
previously considered in a prior administrative or judicial proceeding and dis-
posed of in a manner indicating that discharge is not warranted. Regulations
also provide that no convening authority will direct discharge if a board recom-
mends retention, nor will he authorize the issuance of a discharge less favorable
than that recommended by the board, though he may direct retention when dis-
charge is recommended or he may issue a discharge more favorable than that
recommended. In addition, regulations authorize the convening authority, if
he detects substantial defects in the proceedings of a board, to take the following
actions:
(1) Direct retention.
(2) Return the case to the same board (a) if it has failed to make
findings or recommendations required by the applicable regula-
tions, or (b) if apparent procedural errors or omissions in the rec-
ord may be corrected without reconsideration of the findings and
recommendations of the board.
(3) Set aside the findings and recommendations and refer the case to
a new board for rehearing, if the board committed an error which
100 Ehlert v. United States, 401 U.S. 99 (1971).
101 Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972). He was charged under the UCMJ with
failure to obey orders requiring his transfer to Vietnam, id. at 36.
102 Friedberg v. Resor, 453 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1971).
103 Donham v. Resor, 436 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1971).
104 United States v. Lenox, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 45 C.M.R. 88 (1972).
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materially prejudiced a substantial right of the respondent. In such
case, no member of the new board shall have served on the prior
board, nor may the convening authority approve any portion of
the findings and recommendations of the new board less favorable
to the member than the action of the first board.
6. Review Board
Although no provision is made for direct appeal from determinations made
in accordance with the applicable regulations in discharge cases, the Army Dis-
charge Review Board (ADRB) is a statutory body.. empowered to review
administrative discharges or dismissals. The ADRB established in 1944 was
intended to insure that former members of the armed forces would not be de-
prived unjustly of any veterans' benefit because of a discharge improperly or in-
equitably given.
The Board may review, on its own motion or upon application either by
the former members of by his representative within fifteen years, the discharge
or dismissal of a former members of all discharge actions other than that of a
general court-martial. The Board may change the type and nature of a dis-
charge or dismissal, but it has no power to change the date on a discharge, to
revoke a discharge, or to reinstate any person in the military service. The
Board's actions are based on equitable standards under implementing regulations,
in the absence of congressional direction in this regard. Action of the board is
subject, under the statute, to review by the Secretary of the Army. It is also sub-
ject to judicial review." 6
7. Judicial Observations
A brief, random selection of additional miscellaneous judicial observations
is offered, conceding that they merely illustrate a sampling of some types of ques-
tions which have been raised in litigation involving administrative discharge
procedures and that they do not purport to reflect resolution of the indicated
as well as many other issues that have been raised in literally countless cases.
Erroneous discharge. Notwithstanding the general rule that a discharge
issued by competent authority, though administratively erroneous, normally is
valid and irrevocable, the reactivation of a reservist discharged through error
did not deny due process and equal protection.'
105 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (1970). Also see subsequent consideration of the broad power of
the Army Board for Correction of Military Records, including discharges, ante in text preced-
ing note 184. The Navy and Air Force have similar boards.
106 Van Bourg v. Nitze, 388 F.2d 557, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 1967). For a pre-Harmon
(cited note 76, supra) consideration of the problem of judicial review, see Jones, Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts to Review the Character of Military Administrative Discharge, 57
COLuM. L. REv. 917 (1957). For more recent commentaries on review of military administra-
tion determinations, see Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the Ex-
haustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REv. 483 (1969), reprinted with modifications,
48 MiLrrARY L. Rzv. 91 (1970); Suter, Judicial Review of Military Administrative Deci-
sions, 6 HOUSTON L. Rv. 55 (1968).
107 Winters v. United States, 412 F.2d 140 '(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 920 (1969).
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Judicial review. To gain a judicial stay of discharge proceedings, a peti-
tioner normally must establish (1) irreparable injury to himself unless stay is
granted; (2) absence of substantial harm to other interested parties; (3) absence
of harm to the public interest; and (4) a likelihood that he will prevail on
the merits of his appeal. 0 8
Recommendations. The recommendation of a psychiatrist that a soldier
be discharged as unsuitable was merely advisory since discharge was discretionary
under the applicable regulations.'
Regulations. With the issue in court, an effort by the Army to comply with
a previously disregarded provision of regulation pertaining to application for
hardship discharge was ineffective on motion to dismiss, and the case on appeal
was remanded to the trial court for de novo consideration.1 0
Repetitive requests. A department should not be put to a fully detailed
process, as a new request, of every letter a petitioner for discharge files urging
error in decision on prior request for discharge.1 1 '
Waiver. Where a discharged serviceman had been faced with a legitimate
choice between facing court-martial for fraudulent enlistment or accepting
undesirable discharge, the existence of choice negatived any argument that he
was coerced into signing the discharge request and waiver of hearing and
counsel.'
Witnesses. The presence of witnesses is not required solely for confrontation
purposes where the petitioner seeking temporary injunction and declaratory
judgment was aware of the evidence that would be presented at discharge
hearing and did not request such witnesses to appear, nor seek additional state-
ments from them."' On motion of defendant Secretary for dismissal or for
summary judgment, it was held that the failure of the Air Force to produce the
plaintiff's commander before a board did not deprive him of a fair and impartial
hearing, though the statement of the commander was admitted and considered,
where the plaintiff was fully notified of all charges and statements against him,
failed to make any effort in his own behalf to obtain either the commander's
presence or his statement, and failed to request that Air Force make such effort
until some five months after he was fully notified of the charges against him."4
108 Crawford v. Davis, 249 F. Supp. 943, 945 (E.D. Pa.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 921
(1966); see Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965).
109 Silverthorne v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 443, 446 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1175 (5th
Cir. 1972).
110 Cuadra v. Resor, 437 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1970).
111 Minasian v. Engle, 400 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1968).
112 Haines v. United States, 453 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1971).
113 Unglesby v. Zimny, 250 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Cal. 1965). Cf. Bland v. Connally, 293
F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Davis v. Stahr, 293 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
114 Denton v. Seamans, 315 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Cal. 1970). A number of legislative
reforms have been submitted to provide new or amended administrative discharge procedures.
The Department of Defense has expressed views generally favoring H.R. 10422, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., introduced 6 October 1971, by Rep. Bennett (Fla.), Committee on Armed Services.
His bill would, inter alia, prohibit discharge under other than honorable conditions if the
member concerned were not permitted (under pertinent secretarial rules) to confront adverse
witnesses, did not have legal counsel, and if a legal advisor did not sit as a nonvoting member
of the board hearing his case. The bill provides for appeal to a board of review established




Despite its essential military function, the Department of the Army employs
a large number of civilians (second only to the Postal Service among the federal
agencies), and, of course, the other military departments also employ civilians
on a large scale. The civilian personnel management system is distinct from that
pertaining to military personnel. Unlike the centralized control of military per-
sonnel, authority and responsibility in large measure have been delegated to
installation commanders for civilian personnel management.
There are other basic differences between military and civilian personnel
systems. All military personnel have a specific title and pay, each taking his
title and rate with him as he moves from one assignment to another. On the
civilian side, the title and grade are identified with the job and not the individual,
who must qualify for any job which he fills. Mobility is a prime requisite for
management of military personnel (a factor of extreme importance in litigation
challenging the validity of military assignments), whereas the civilian works
in the location of his choice and any subsequent move normally is at his volition.
This relative continuity contributes to desired flexibility for the military. Essen-
tially, civilians are employed to perform functions which do not require military
personnel for reasons of law, training, security, discipline, rotation, or combat
readiness, or which do not entail unusual working conditions normally incom-
patible with civilian employment. Civilian employment historically has permitted
release of military personnel for duties which can best be performed by personnel
having the requisite military background. Military supervisors must work closely
with staff civilian personnel officers to insure thorough understanding of regula-
tions which govern civilian personnel and conversely to preclude improper ap-
plication of rules intended solely for military personnel." 5
1. Classification
The "civil service" consists of all appointive positions in the executive, judi-
cial, and legislative branches of the Government of the United States, except
positions in the uniformed services (i.e., armed forces, commissioned corps of
the Public Health Service, and the Environmental Science Services Administra-
tion) . "' Civilian employees of the Department of the Army are covered by
regulations of the Civil Service Commission, as well as by Army Civilian Per-
sonnel Regulations. The Commission is the presidential arm for the administra-
tion of the "competitive service" (also referred to as classified civil service or
classified service), a term which embraces all civil service positions or classified
service not excepted by statute or positions to which appointments are made by
nomination for confirmation by the Senate unless included by statute."7 Civilian
personnel fall under several headings:
Classified employees. In this group are those whose pay is determined by
115 SOLO, supra note 1, Civil Law, pt. B, at 40.
116 5 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970).
117 5 U.S.C. § 2102 (1970).
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reference to the General Schedule (e.g., a "GS-7" is an employee paid at the
grade 7 level), established by Congress for classified positions.1 ' Each grade
in turn is broken down into ten "steps" of increased pay, available to an incum-
bent after completion of prescribed conditions of employment at an "acceptable
level of competence.""'  In addition, employees are eligible for accelerated
advancement upon demonstration of "high quality" performance. 2 '
Excepted employees. These are persons who are excepted from competitive
examination,' 2' though like others in the civil service they also must meet pre-
scribed qualifications for employment. In most respects, they are treated as
employees classified under the General Schedule.
Wage board employees. These are employees paid according to prevailing
wages in their particular skill in the local geographic area where they are em-
ployed.1 22
Nonappropriated fund employees. These are employees of a particular
nonappropriated fund (e.g., Officers Open Mess, Exchange, etc.) established
under departmental procedures. They are not regarded as employees of the
United States but, especially in more recent times, have become entitled by regu-
lations to working conditions comparable to their associates who are paid out
of funds appropriated by Congress for their hire.
As in the case of military personnel administration, civilian management
is a subject of many interrelated topics, most of which are handled by personnel
experts. To illustrate only a few of the obvious issues involved in personnel prac-
tices which have erupted into visible litigation, references will be made later to
selected judicial precedents arising out of adverse personnel actions.
2. Labor-management relations
Experience of the armed forces with collective bargaining began in the early
1800's at shipyards and arsenals. It was not until the end of the 19th century,
however, that the War Department issued an order for certain commanders to
deal with grievance committees and to refer unresolved matters to the Depart-
ment. By the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912121 the right of federal (postal) em-
ployees to organize was first recognized. 4 President John F. Kennedy's Execu-
tive Order 10988 issued in 1962"s for the first time formally established govern-
ment-wide policy favoring employee-management cooperation in the federal
service. Under that policy, employees became entitled to form, join, and assist
118 5 U.S.C. §§ 5101, 5332 (1970).
119 5 U.S.C. § 5335 (1970).
120 5 U.S.C. § 5336 (1970).
121 5 U.S.C. § 2103 (1970).
122 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 5541, 5544, 6102 (1970).
123 Now 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1970).
124 Postal personnel are now employed by the United States Postal Service, an independent
establishment of the executive branch, 39 U.S.C. § 201 (1970), and their union activities
generally are equated to that of the private sector.
125 Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (Comp. 1959-63) was issued pursuant to presi-
dential authority to prescribe regulations for admission into the civil service and for the con-
duct of employees in the executive branch, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 7301 (1970).
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any employee organization or to refrain therefrom. 2' Within six years, more
than half of all federal civilian employees were represented by labor organiza-
tions with exclusive bargaining rights. Union representation has continued to
increase since that time.12
In addition to establishing a general government-wide policy favoring labor-
management cooperation in the federal service, including the recognition of em-
ployee organizations as bargaining representatives, EO 10988 retained certain
rights for management while limiting the rights of employees to strike or dis-
criminate, and specifically authorized advisory arbitration as the final step in
a negotiated grievance procedure. Excluded from exclusive bargaining units
under the Order were managerial executives, employees engaged in nonclerical
personnel work, rating supervisors of other members of the unit, and persons
engaged in intelligence and investigative functions.
3. Executive Order 11491
Organizational rights and the privilege of negotiating on employment terms
were strengthened by the issuance of a subsequent superseding order by President
Richard M. Nixon on 29 October 1969."' Under EO 11491, the entire pro-
gram of employee-management relations was placed under the supervision of
a Federal Labor Relations Council. A high-level governmental panel also was
created to assist agency officials and union representatives to resolve negotiationr
impasses. Membership in a labor organization continues to be voluntary for
employees. In accordance with principles established in the private sector, the
federal program authorizes establishment of a representation unit on a plant,
installation, craft, functional, or other basis which will ensure a clear and identi-
fiable community of interest among the employees. Also, guards may not be
mixed with nonguard employees. Professional employees are given the option
to express their preference concerning their inclusion in a unit of nonprofes-
sionals.
A union that has shown by secret ballot election that it represents a majority
of the employees has the exclusive right to confer with agency officials and to
enter into agreements covering the employees. Negotiable matters include those
personnel policies and practices affecting employment conditions within the
administrative discretion of the agency officials, which do not concern the agency
mission, organization, budget, assignment of personnel, the technology of per-
forming its work, or its internal security. A union agreement may provide for
the consideration of employee grievances, subject to requirements of the Civil
126 The courts have declined to entertain actions arising under the order. Nat'l Ass'n
of Int. Rev. Employees v. Dillon, 356 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Manhattan-Bronx Postal
Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Morris v. Steele, 253 F. Supp. 769
(D. Mass. 1966); though they have occasionally entertained jurisdiction where a constitu-
tional issue was raised, Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. White, 418 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.
1969); or where civil service laws are violated, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Paine, 436
F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
127 SOLO, supra note 1, Civil Law, pt. 5, at 50.
128 Exec. Order No. 11491, 3 C.F.R. 191 (Comp. 1969), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
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Service Commission. Employees are specifically denied the right to strike and
may not join a union which asserts that right.129
4. Grievance and Appeal
Under the departmental grievance and appeal system, 3 ' employees may
request review of dissatisfactions concerning working conditions and relation-
ships, or employment status, including adverse actions, except as to matters
beyond the responsibility of the department. In practice, certain other matters
also are excluded from the system, in favor of remedies under other controlling
regulations. Such grievances are to be distinguished from those governed by
procedures negotiated in a union agreement under EO 11491.
Grievances are handled on a relatively informal basis, though they are
subject initially to review by the Civilian Appellate Review Agency (GARA),
whose decisions on procedural matters are binding, and then by a major com-
mander if the immediate commander does not agree with the CARA examiner's
recommendations.
Appeal from adverse actions (e.g., removal, suspension, reduction in rank
or pay) involves a hearing if considered necessary by the examiner. 31 If, at any
stage of an inquiry, the examiner establishes the existence of a regulatory or
procedural defect which requires reversal in the processing of the appeal, he
will discontinue the proceedings and forward the case to the activity commander
indicating that the action appealed should be reversed. Such a finding is binding
upon the commander.
Hearings generally are not open to the public or the press."' The employee
is entitled to representation, whether by an employee of the federal govern-
ment (who may use reasonable official time without loss of pay; but this provision
does not apply when repeated representation would interfere with the perform-
ance of regular duties) or not, but in any event arrangements for representation
must be made by the employee.
Hearings are conducted in a manner intended to encourage frank but
orderly presentation of all relevant facts, through sworn testimony and exhibits,
subject to cross-examination. Although subpoena powers are not available, the
appellant may request the agency to produce witnesses.' 3 Proceedings are re-
corded and transcribed verbatim. Any information which has a bearing on
matters in issue may be presented by the parties without regard to rules of
evidence before a court, provided the source of the information is identified.
129 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1970). See United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp.
879 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
130 5 C.F.R. pt. 771 (1972); Dep't of the Army, Civilian Personnel Regulation 700, June
7, 1971.
131 In at least one circumstance, the waiver of a hearing (coupled with an appellant's
protest of innocence) did not relieve the agency from holding a hearing if such procedure
would lead to better understanding of the issues and more equitable action. Connelly v.
Nitze, 401 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
132 See 5 C.F.R. § 772.305 (1972). In one case, however, the court believed that an
employee is constitutionally entitled to have an open hearing, if he desires. Fitzgerald v.
Hampton, 329 F. Supp. 997 (D.D.C. 1971).
133 If he fails to make such request, he is not likely to be heard to allege lack of con-
frontation. Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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The task of evaluating the record ultimately rests with the official responsible
for the final decision. In the absence of a finding by the examiner of either a
regulatory or procedural defect, the commander is required to issue a written
decision. If he determines that the examiner's recommendations are unaccept-
able, he will transmit the file, with a specific statement of the basis for his deter-
mination, to the appropriate superior headquarters. The employee has a right
to request review by the Secretary, whose decision is not subject to further
administrative review.
5. Judicial Review
As in the case of the military, the courts have recently evinced more interest
in reviewing cases involving the government's application of personnel policies.134
As late as 1957, a court of appeals asserted that employee removal and discipline
are entirely matters of agency discretion and so long as there is substantial com-
pliance with applicable procedures the administrative determination is not re-
viewable as to the wisdom or good judgment of the department exercising its
discretion. 3 ' By 1969, the pendulum seemingly had swung so far that another
court of appeals could reverse a district court (which had sustained a dismissal
for failure of the employee to care for official documents and to fail to report
a proffered bribe), stating that the lower court had not discharged its statutory
duty to review the administrative record and that review was not limited to
determining whether statutory procedural requirements had been satisfied. "'
On the other hand, in another case, it was assumed that the applicable statutes
and regulations provide all essential administrative due process, something quite
apart from judicial due process."' This seems to mean that the personnel in-
volved, because of their federal employee status, are not guaranteed (as to matters
bearing on that relation) the full panoply of constitutional due process but that
they are entitled to basic concepts of fair play nonetheless. Another circuit
adheres to the doctrine that it is not empowered to reverse agency action unless
the decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, or unsupported by substantial
evidence. 3 The Court of Claims has said that agency findings will not be dis-
turbed in absence of procedural illegality, misconstruction of governing law,
134 For observations on the beginnings of that trend, see Note, Dismissal of Federal Em-
ployees-the Emerging Judicial Role, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 719 (1966). See Carr v. United
States, 337 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Cal. 1972) for a more recent review of precedents enlarging
upon the traditional limited review of personnel cases.
135 Hargett v. Summerfield, 243 F.2d 29, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
136 Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1969). A concurring judge, how-
ever, suggested congressional action for a "murky and troublesome area." Id. at 400. Upon
reconsideration, after remand to the district court and upon the latter's "thorough review of
the administrative record," the court of appeals was satisfied that the administrative dis-
charge was not "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion" (notwithstanding the court's
gratuitous comments that it might have drawn inferences from the evidence "different' from
those drawn by the agency and that removal was a "severe punishment" for the violations
charged). 462 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3288.
137 Davis v. Berzak, 405 F.2d 642 (10th Cir. 1969).
138 Halsey v. Nitze, 390 F.2d 142, 144 (4th Cir. 1968). A "reasonable, substantial and
probative" test was applied in Marlowe v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, 457 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1972).
[February, 1973:]
MILITARY LAW, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
or "other vital error,"' 3 9 and in commenting on its role in review, a district
court said, "The most the court can do is to insure that the administrative agency
does not arbitrarily or capriciously place undue reliance on inherently unreliable
evidence."'"
Although there is no guarantee of job retention pending the outcome of an
administrative appeal, 41 particular circumstances may warrant interim injunc-
tive relief. 2 In this connection though the rule precluding review prior to
exhaustion by the appellant of appropriate administrative remedies generally is
applicable, if the prescribed procedure is clearly inadequate to prevent irrepa-
rable injury, or when there is a clear and unambiguous statutory violation, the
courts are not likely to defer consideration.' 4
An area of the administrative process that is peculiarly susceptible to pit-
falls which may not be carefully regarded in the tension which attends the onset
of a serious adverse action but which, in the calm aftermath of review, frequently
discloses prejudicial error is the initial notice by which the individual is informed
of the contemplated action and the reason therefor. The precise content of the
notice inevitably will vary with the nature of the circumstances. Nevertheless,
lack of specificity in setting forth the particulars of the charge generally will
result at some level in the administrative process or upon judicial review in a
voiding of the action for improper procedure.' 4
Some additional recent examples of issues highlighted on judicial review
include: back pay and setoff of other earnings, 45 bias," conflict of interest (as
to attorney representing Government),"1 conviction by civil court (violation of
city ordinance),' defamation, 4 9 discrimination, 5 ' hearsay evidence,' homo-
sexuality,'52 immoral conduct, 13 incompetence," minor charge (remaining
139 Bielec v. United States, 456 F.2d 690 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Lech v. United States, 409
F.2d 252 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
140 Carr v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 1172, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In that case, the
court also indicated that circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial evidence.
141 Frommhagen v. Klein, 456 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1972).
142 Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
143 Cf. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Resor, 442 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1971).
144 See Burkett v. United States, 402 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1968), for example of a notice
generally deficient and also including prejudicial material extraneous to the issue.
145 Floyd v. Resor, 409 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1969).
146 Issue of personal prejudice remanded for consideration by trial commissioner, not-
withstanding operating level decision was approved by a commander three levels higher.
Reynolds v. United States, 454 F.2d 1368 (Ct. CI. 1972).
147 Camero v. United States, 375 F.2d 777 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
148 Vigil v. Post Office, 406 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1969).
149 Jackson v. United States, No. 291-69 (Ct. CI., Jan. 19, 1972), Frommhagen v. Glazer,
442 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1971); Swaaley v. United States, 376
F.2d 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Veatch v. Resor, 266 F. Supp. 893 (D. Colo. 1967).
150 Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1971).
151 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Reil v. United States, 456 F.2d 777
(Ct. Cl. 1972); Marlowe v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 457
F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1972); Kowal v. United States, 412 F.2d 867 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Peters
v. United States, 408 F.2d 719 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Brown v. Macy, 340 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.
1965).
152 Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Schlegel v. United States, 416
F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970); Anonymous v. Macy, 398
F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1968); Holman v. United States, 383 F.2d 411 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Gayer
v. Laird, 332 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1971); Ulrich v. Laird, No. 203-71 (D.D.C., Sept. 17,
1971). Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82 H.v.
L. REv. 1738 (1969).
153 Mindel v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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A military commander often is faced with the need to obtain credible in-
formation upon which to exercise his powers under applicable statutes, regula-
tions or established customs and usages of the service. He may have to deter-
mine the cause of death or injury sustained by personnel under his supervision,
damage to military property in his custody, liability for loss of funds or equip-
ment, or to confirm initial reports of incidents which may, in turn, require specific
inquiries or other action under pertinent laws or regulations. Such investigations
are useful in the prompt collection, assembly, and preservation of evidence for
subsequent analysis and consideration by the commander. The investigative
process may be informal or formal, culminating in oral or written reports, as
determined by the commander, subject to governing directives. The commander
may direct a single individual or a group, usually designated as a board, to
conduct the inquiry.'
In the absence of other governing directives, such investigative bodies derive
their power from the appointing authority and can act only within the limits
of the powers delegated to them. Specific rules cannot be prescribed to cover
all situations. However, using ingenuity and imagination, the investigator's prime
objective is to gather all pertinent facts, reporting them accurately and concisely.
Customary investigative techniques may include, as appropriate to the type of
investigation, examining the site of the incident, interviewing witnesses, making
sketches and photographs, compiling applicable references, and ultimately (sub-
ject to applicable directives and instructions) submitting a report embodying
findings and recommendations for consideration by the appointing authority. 60
Directives or orders may require an investigation without prescribing specific
procedural guidance. In such cases, a general Army Regulation, AR 15-6,16'
offers elementary guidance intended to apply whenever other specific procedural
requirements do not exist.'
154 Salter v. United States, 412 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1969), Ruderer v. United States, 412
F.2d 1285 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
155 Reil v. United States, 456 F.2d 777 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (will not save a dismissal predicated
on the more serious charge).
156 Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934
(1970); Jarett v. United States, 451 F.2d 623 (Ct. C1. 1971); Drucker v. United States,
451 F.2d 619 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
157 Albert v. United States, 437 F.2d 976 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Bright v. Macy, 278 F. Supp.
215 (D. Md. 1967).
158 Motto v. Gen. Servs. Adm'n of the United States, 335 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. La. 1971).
159 Boards of officers also may serve in an administrative or adjudicative capacity, as distin-
guished from exclusively investigative responsibility.
160 SOLO, supra note 1, at 102-04.
161 32 C.F.R. pt. 519 (1972).
162 Generally investigating boards which consider discharge of enlisted personnel or elimina-
tion of officers follow AR 15-6 rules, as supplemented or modified by other applicable regula-
tions.
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An effort will be made in the following paragraphs to set forth some of
the generally pertinent procedural rules, with the caveat that proceedings in a
particular case may be subject to express statutory or administrative require-
ments. In the absence of such governing provisions, the procedures generally are
subject to the AR 15-6 rules and pertinent official construction of those proce-
dures, including opinions of legal advisors at the appropriate command levels.
2. Procedure
a. Respondent's Privileges
A respondent in an investigative proceedings is one whose conduct, status,
efficiency, character, fitness, pecuniary liability, or rights are under official scru-
tiny. An individual may be regarded as a respondent at the outset of the investi-
gation or at any later stage in the proceedings when it appears that he has a
direct interest in the subject of the investigations, e.g., when tentative findings
or recommendations reflect questionable or unsatisfactory conduct, inefficiency, or
unfitness, or when his pecuniary responsibility may be affected.
A respondent usually is entitled to have counsel, either military or civilian,
and any military person or civilian employee requested will be appointed as
counsel if reasonably available. In appropriate cases he may be entitled to a
hearing before a board of impartial officers and permitted to challenge members
for cause. Ordinarily, he is entitled to be present at the hearing, to examine
all documentary evidence referred with the case not subject to security require-
ments,'63 to present evidence in his own behalf, to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses, 164 and to submit a brief. 6 s
The procedure of military investigators or boards reflects a relaxation of
formal judicial procedure and is somewhat akin to that of civilian administrative
agencies, where optional privileges are determined by balancing the interests
of the party against the requirements of administrative expediency within limits
established as a minimum for administrative due process. 6" Although formal,
technical rules may be disregarded where they would be administratively burden-
some, such determinations may not be arbitrary or capricious. The respondent
must be judged upon substantial, credible evidence after having been permitted
to present his side of the case. Generally, a respondent will be entitled to indi-
cated privileges when it would be otherwise manifestly unfair to proceed against
him.167
163 Failure of board of inquiry to give respondent summary of report of alleged security
violation denied fair and impartial hearing. Grimm v. Brown, 291 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D.
Cal. 1968).
164 Lack of information of adverse witnesses discussed but not decided as a constitutional
question. Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
165 See Friedberg v. Resor, 453 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1971) (discussion of respondents rights
under AR 15-6).
166 The congressional standard of "fair and impartial" hearing should be interpreted to
apply to an administrative hearing in military service, as distinguished from nonmilitary
agencies. Brown v. Gamage, 377 F.2d 154 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 858 (1967).
Cf. Dunmar v. Ailes, 348 F.2d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1965) '(minimum standards of funda-
mental fairness).




AR 15-6 contemplates a mutually complete and impartial presentation of
evidence by both sides so as to provide an adequate basis for appropriate action
by the appointing authority. Whenever possible, the highest quality of evidence
obtainable and available will be considered."0 8 Findings must be supported by
substantial evidence, i.e., such evidence as a reasonable mind can accept as ade-
quate to support a conclusion.'69 Unless stipulated by all parties, evidence bear-
ing upon the results, taking, or refusal of polygraph tests is inadmissible. Except
for these considerations, an investigating officer or board of officers is not bound
by the traditional rules of evidence. Any oral or written matter, including hear-
say, which is deemed relevant and material may be received in evidence.
c. Administratiue Review
The findings and recommendations of a board, not made conclusive by law
or regulation, are advisory only. The appointing authority may therefore, unless
circumscribed by governing law or regulations, approve, modify, set aside, or
wholly disregard the findings and recommendations of an investigative proceed-
ing. Also the appointing or review authority who takes final action may modify
or set aside his own previous action unless such new action is deemed to be legally
beyond his authority. 7 ' Although in certain cases there may be no right to ap-
peal from the action taken, the appointing or reviewing authority may, as an
exercise of discretion, receive and act upon any request in the nature of an appeal
or petition for a new hearing. Also, regulations which provide in general terms
for "appeal" from adverse administrative determinations without specifying
hearings and correlative rights (such as, e.g, assistance of counsel, right of con-
frontation and cross-examination) do not necessarily deny legal process.''
In general, the proceedings of boards of officers are legally insufficient where
a jurisdictional defect appears, when the respondent's rights have been sub-
stantially prejudiced by a procedural error, 2 or when there is insufficient sub-
stantial evidence to support the findings or recommendations. Among possible
including the conduct of hearings, see Weaver v. Finch, 306 F. Supp. 1185, 1189-90 (W.D.
Mo. 1969).
168 Inadmissible evidence in itself is not such error as would likely justify a successful
appeal. See Crawford v. Davis, 249 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 921
(1966).
169 The possibility of drawing inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not pre-
clude a particular finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Consolo v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
170 Bookman v. United States, 453 F.2d 1263 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
171 Ansted v. Resor, 437 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 827 (1971) (affirm-
ing decision that plaintiff who challenged validity of involuntary order to active duty had not
been denied due process under military procedures).
172 Where no harm or prejudice resulted from violation of prescribed regulations, adminis-
trative proceedings may not be invalidated. United States ex rel. Hermes v. McNulty, 432
F.2d 1182, 1188 (7th Cir. 1970). See United States v. Primous, 420 F.2d 33, 35 (7th Cir.
1970). Where several procedural errors were alleged but none had such fundamental sub-
stance as would produce a likelihood of success on appeal, nevertheless the cumulative effect
thereof may result in fundamental error. Crawford v. Davis, 249 F. Supp. 943, 948 (E.D.
Pa.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 921 (1966).
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jurisdictional defects is an improper appointing authority or an improper
composition of the board.
Where specific regulations do not otherwise prescribe, the following rules
apply when the proceedings are found to be legally insufficient for the indicated
reasons:
a. Jurisdictional defect: Proceedings are a nullity and the matter
may be considered anew by a board whose voting composition includes
none of the voting members of the old board.
b. Procedural error: Except as limited by the following provision,
the matter may be considered anew by a board, as in the preceding case.
c. Insufficient evidence: If necessary additional evidence is avail-
able, the investigation is returned to the same board for completion after
which the report is again reviewed for legal sufficiency;17 otherwise
further action is not appropriate.
3. Particular Investigations
a. Reports of Survey
Members and employees of the Army are not absolute insurers of Army
property entrusted to their care. Their liability for loss or damage to such
property derives from negligent or otherwise wrongful conduct respecting its use
or custody, determined primarily through the report of survey system." 4 Under
former rules, users of Army property were exposed to broad risks of liability, but
since 1963 rules constituting grounds of pecuniary liability have been simplified
and less stringent. As a result liability is conditioned on more aggravated mis-
conduct than before and distinctions between officers and enlisted personnel no
longer exist under the general rules." 5
Current rules provide:
1. Individuals having supervisory responsibility will be charged
with any loss caused by their willful misconduct or gross negligence.
2. Individuals having personal responsibility will be charged for
any loss caused by their negligence or misconduct. Personal responsibility
extends only to property converted to personal use without authority
and arms and equipment held for exclusive personal use (not including
motor vehicles, typewriters, and tool sets).
3. Individuals may be charged for loss of property not in their
personal custody or under their supervisory control where such loss was
occasioned by their willful misconduct or gross negligence.
173 MvfILITARY AFFAiRs, supra note 1, at para. 12.12.
174 Though not designated by statutory law, the survey system is recognized as an adminis-
trative determination for the purposes of 37 U.S.C. § 1007(c) (1970), at least as to enlisted
personnel. Somewhat narrow statutory terms provide for involuntary loss of pay for officers.
There are also separate rules for involuntary deduction of civilian pay to satisfy findings of
pecuniary liability.
175 SOLO, supra note 1, at 112-17.
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4. Individuals who occupy assigned government quarters or have
been issued government property for use in family quarters, will be
charged (except for loss from fair wear and tear or act of God) with
loss resulting to such quarters or property due to the occupant's simple
negligence or an act of another where the evidence shows that the oc-
cupant failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care. Willful damage
to Army property results in liability under any of the rules and negli-
gence of any character must be related to the damage by proximate
cause.
b. Line of Duty (LOD)
LOD investigations are conducted to determine whether disease or injury
of a member of the military was incurred while he was conducting himself as a
member of the Army. Such determinations, in turn, may affect obligations or
entitlement to rights and benefits under statutes administered by the Army, Vet-
erans Administration, or other government agencies." 8 Investigations are con-
ducted according to AR 15-6 procedures, as supplemented or modified by the
rules governing LOD investigations. The appointing authority normally is the
special court-martial authority (usually the commander of a battalion or com-
parable size unit) over the unit to which the individual is assigned or of that
completing the investigation. The next reviewing level is that of the general
court-martial jurisdiction (usually installation or division commander), while
(in the United States) numbered continental Army commanders and certain
higher level commanders are authorized to take final action. Appeals not sus-
tained by the final approving authority are forwarded for action at the depart-
ment level. Determinations are predicated upon the following basic policy:
Injury or disease is presumed to have been incurred in LOD and not because of
the member's own misconduct unless there is substantial evidence that the injury
or disease was-
(1) Proximately caused by the intentional misconduct or willful
gross neglect of the individual;
(2) Incurred or contracted during a period of unauthorized
absence;
(3) Incurred or contracted while neither on active duty nor en-
gaged in authorized training in an active or reserve duty status and was
not aggravated by the service. 7 '
Mere violation of military regulations, orders, or instructions, or of civil or
criminal laws, in the absence of further showing of misconduct therewith, estab-
lishes no more than simple negligence (which does not constitute misconduct for
LOD purposes).
176 For a compilation of statutes involved, see Comment, ... In the Line of His Duty,"
50 MILTARY L. Rv. 117 (1970), which emphasizes the gradual liberalization of line of
duty criteria and includes selected digests of recent opinions reflecting illustrative factual situa-
tions. The applicable Army regulation is Army Reg. 600-33 (1971).
177 Army Reg. 600-33 para. 2-1 (1971).
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If, after reasonable investigation, facts are substantially unknown or in
irreconcilable conflict, the basic presumption favoring line of duty and against
misconduct must prevail. Authorized findings include (1) "In line of duty,"
(2) "Not in line of duty-not due to misconduct," and (3) "Not in line of duty
-- due to own misconduct"; no deviations are permitted.
4. Article 138 and Other Statutory Procedures
a. Article 138, UCMJ
Article 138, UCMJ, '7 continues provision of long standing 79 for procedure
by which a member of the armed forces could complain to a superior commander
for redress if he believed himself wronged by his commanding officer. Under the
present article, the complaint is forwarded to the commander exercising general
court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against whom it is made. That com-
mander is required to "examine into the complaint and take proper measures for
redressing the wrong," after which the records are forwarded to the department
for final disposition.
Pertinent regulations provide that upon receipt of a complaint submitted
under the article, the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the
respondent will either grant the redress requested (or if he lacks authority to
grant the redress requested, investigate the complaint and forward the complaint,
investigation, and specific recommendations to the jurisdiction having authority)
or:
a. Delay consideration of the complaint pending consideration of
another appeal likely to result in clarification of the issue or redress of
the alleged wrong; or
b. Conduct an informal inquiry, or order an investigation under
AR 15-6; or
c. Return the correspondence to the complainant informing him
that the complaint is not within the scope of the statute. 80
Upon completion of his inquiry into the complaint and action thereon (approval
or denial of the requested redress), the officer exercising general court-martial
jurisdiction forwards the file, including the action taken thereon and a state-
ment of the reasons therefor, to the Judge Advocate General, Department of
the Army.
Appropriate review of the treatment accorded the complaint depends largely
on the depth of the inquiry conducted into the complaint by the general court-
178 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1970). See Army Reg. 27-14 (1972).
179 See, e.g., American Articles of War of 1775, enacted 30 June 1775, Nos. XIII, XIV,
by the second Continental Congress, W. WINTHROP, supra note 5, at 954. For an analysis
of the statute's history, see Nemrow, Complaints of Wrong Under Article 138, 2 MILITARY
L. REv. 43 (1958).
180 Under Army Reg. 27-14 (1972), art. 138 may not be used as the basis of a collateral
attack against the findings or sentence of a court-martial or nonjudicial punishment imposed
pursuant to art. 15, UCMJ.
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martial authority. Since the thrust of most complaints will be that the com-
mander abused his discretion, mere conclusions that the complaint was not
justified would not supply a sufficient basis upon which to make final disposition
of the case. Therefore, the inquiry should identify and develop the factors which
influenced the commander's decision.'
b. Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR)
A statutory board of extraordinary powers is the Army Board for Correction
of Military Records established in 1946, to relieve the Congress of the many
private bills submitted annually on behalf of members and former members of
the armed forces petitioning for action not compatible with existing military
records." 2
As indicated, the ABCMR was intended to provide relief in cases where
Congress previously acted and therefore it was empowered to do what Congress
could have done." 3 Any type of military record may be corrected, including
discharges, efficiency records, and records of trial.8 Although the statutory
language implies the existence of a record to be corrected, it has been observed
that the Board may create a record if this is necessary in order to remove an
injustice.' Statutory limitations require only that the Board's action must affect
a military record and that such action must correct an error or remove an
injustice. The Board decides what is error and may substitute its own judgment
for that of any official or board which made a previous determination of the
matter. Investigation and action by the Board is authorized only upon the ap-
plication of the individual concerned within 3 years of the latter's discovery of
the alleged error or injustice (though the Board may excuse late filing in the
interest of justice). The Secretary may overrule the Board, but only if the find-
ings and recommendations are not supported by the record. 6 Corrections made
by the Secretary pursuant to Board recommendations are "final and conclusive
on all officers of the Government" except when procured by fraud. Normally,
they will not be reviewed by the courts in the absence of a showing based on
evidence already in the record that the action was arbitrary or capricious,
8 7
though it is clear that judicial review is not precluded. 8
c. Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
Although the APA'8 9 has been said to be generally applicable to the military
181 See Note, Processing of Complaints Under Article 138 UCMJ, 1 THE ARmY LAWYER,
Oct., 1971, at 13.
182 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1972).
183 40 Op. ATT'y GEN. 504 (1947). For a review of the ABOMR early history, see Wil-
lianas, The Army Board for Correction of Military Records, 6 MILITARY L. Rv. 41 (1959).
184 See MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at para. 13.7.
185 Op JAGA 1953/1741, 3 DIG Ops, Records § 16.3.
186 E.g., Nelson v. Miller, 373 F.2d 474, 478 (3d Cir. 1967).
187 E.g., Sanford v. United States, 399 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1968).
188 Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965).
189 Scattered in various sections of title 5, United States Code.
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and civil functions of the Army, 9 ' significant portions of the act concerning rule
making,19' adjudication,'92 hearings, 19 3 decisions, 9 ' and hearing examiners,
are regarded by the military as inapplicable to the Army's military functions.'
APA includes a section on "ancillary matters";19 which deals with rights
of appearance and representation by counsel, the conduct of investigations, issu-
ance of subpoenas on behalf of parties to agency proceedings, and notice of
denials of applications made to an agency. The provision contains no specific
"military functions" exception and appears to be applicable to the Army. In
addition, sections dealing with judicial review 98 appear to be generally applicable
to the Army, 99 though there is less than unanimity as to their effect on the Army
in specific circumstances.9 ' At least one military commentator cites legislative
history for the argument that while certain war and defense functions were to be
exempt, this was not the intent for other functions.2"' More recently in an action
by an environmental group involving the Secretary of Transportation, a court of
appeals determined that the issuance of a permit by the U. S. Corps of Engineers






Existing at military installations are certain miscellaneous organizations
whose operations are not funded by congressional appropriations-hence their
generic designation as "nonappropriated funds," or nonappropriated fund
(NAF) activities. Customarily, they consist of exchanges (formerly post ex-
changes), open messes, and similar quasi-military organizations, established for
190 MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at para. 12-7. Cf., Reed v. Franke, 297 F.2d 17,
21-22 (4th Cir. 1961).
191 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). For an example of a court entertaining jurisdiction of a
challenge to military "rule making," see Bridges v. Davis, 443 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972) (a determination favorable to the military).
192 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
193 Id. at § 556.
194 Id. at § 557.
195 Id. at § 3105.
196 Op JAGA 1961/4945, Aug. 17, 1961; MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at para. 12.7.
197 5 U.S.C. § 555 '(1970).
198 Id. at §§ 701-706.
199 Overseas Media Corp. v. McNamara, 385 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See MILITARY
AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at para. 12.7.
200 E.g., United States ex rel. Schonbrum v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371 (2d
Cir. 1968); Updegraff v. Talbott, 221 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1955); Cossey v. Seamans, 344
F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Okla. 1972). See Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinations
and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REv. 483 (1969), reprinted with
modifications, 48 MILITARY L. Rsv. 91, 96 (1970).
201 Suter, Judicial Review of Military Administrative Decisions, 6 HousToN L. Rav. 55,
57 (1968).
202 Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1970). See
generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Akers v.
Resor, 339 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn. 1972). Varying results reflect particular statutes and
circumstances applying to authority committed to Army officials.
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the purpose of contributing to the morale and comfort of military personnel and
their families. Considered in the aggregate, they constitute the nonappropriated
fund "system."
Within the resources of that system, such organizations are to a considerable
extent self-supporting. Their principal income arises from the revenue-producing
operations of exchanges, which may be supplemented by special income of the
individual activity itself. In addition, they receive assistance in varying degree,
either in manpower, physical facilities, or financial support, from monies which
have been appropriated by Congress and allocated in accordance with depart-
mental policy. Incidental support based on congressional appropriations is not
regarded as affecting the basic nature of NAF activities."' 3
Historically, nonappropriated funds are traced to nongovernmental sources
for subsistence, quarters, and other forms of personal maintenance support for
troops, under some form of official control, initially instituted to overcome obvi-
ous disadvantages of solicitation by unscrupulous "camp followers." Thus
British Articles of War of the 17th and 18th centuries regulated private civilian
suppliers-traders known variously as sutlers and victuallers-of liquor, victuals,
and other incidentals in their private transactions with the troops; Continental
Army and early American Articles contained similar provisions.'" Under ap-
plicable regulations, the independent vendor operated under a concession from
the military authorities which permitted him to sell his wares and credit sales
against the pay of his military customers. He was then reimbursed by the pay-
master, less a charge based on the average number of personnel assigned to the
unit during the pay period. Those charges (supplemented by fines collected
from traders for breach of Articles of War) provided a separate financial basis
for early troop morale and recreational purposes. That system evolved into unit
(e.g., company), welfare, and library funds, followed by consolidated officer and
noncommissioned officer messes.2"5
By 1866 sutlers had fallen into disrepute, and they were replaced, first by
trading posts, and then by canteens which were later redesignated as post ex-
changes. By 1895, post exchanges operated at all military posts."" Today the
Exchange Service is a highly organized activity paralleling complex civilian
merchandising enterprises. Despite its vast expansion, the Exchange Service
retains the characteristics and basic nature of a NAF. On a lesser scale, messes
(formerly essentially food dispensing facilities) have grown into clubs catering
various recreational and morale services in addition to food. By contrast, the
company fund and similar NAF activities have undergone only slight modifica-
tions and continue to supply services on a relatively small scale.
203 MILITARY AFFAMS, supra note 1, at 152-53.
204 Articles of War of James II (1688), British Articles of 1765, and the American Arti-
cles of 1775, reprinted in App. V, VII, and IX, W. WINTHROP, MILrrARY LAWS AND PREC-
EDENTS 920, 931, 953 (2d Ed. 1920).
205 Messes received as their principal source of revenue savings accrued from economical
use of issued rations.
206 This evolution is traced in more detail by Kovar, Legal Aspects of Nonappropriated
Fund Activities, 1 MILITARY L. Rav. 95 (1958) and Scolnick & Packer, Evolution of the
Army and Air Force Exchange Service, 8 JAG. L. Rnv. Sept.-Oct., 1966, at 19.
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b. Administration
NAF activities are established under secretarial authority, though their
existence is recognized in various statutory provisions affecting certain limited
aspects of their operations."0 7 They are familiarly known as government instru-
mentalities and are generally regarded as entitled to the privileges and immunities
of the United States, though they have been described as "an anomaly of the
law"2 ' and have been variously treated by courts and governmental agencies
according to particular circumstances. Departmental regulations preclude ac-
crual by members of any proprietary interest in the assets controlled by the fund
in which they hold membership or whose services they use.
Organizationally, the funds are established at various command levels and
normally are directed by councils or similar governing bodies under the manage-
ment of a qualified custodian and subject to control of commanders as prescribed
by applicable regulations. They fall loosely into three classes: revenue-producing
(exchanges, motion picture services, publications, restaurants), welfare (designed
to finance recreational, educational, and related activities, typified by military
unit funds), and sundry or association funds. The latter type encompasses such
diverse activities as messing, billeting, and recreational facilities, including flying
and parachute clubs, as well as fish and wildlife groups.
Subject to command supervision as indicated, they tend to operate as
separate units somewhat insulated from the normal military administrative
pattern, though clearly not completely isolated from traditional aspects of military
discipline. In such matters as bank deposits, insurance, and contracts, the name
of the fund is used rather than that of the United States or the sponsoring military
organization. Their activities ordinarily are conducted by civilian personnel paid
from nonappropriated funds"'s though there are limited circumstances under
which military personnel and civilians paid by appropriated funds may be
utilized. In addition, enlisted personnel may be employed by such funds when
they are not required to perform assigned military duties (i.e., when "off
duty") .210
c. Government Instrumentalities
The legal concept of nonappropriated funds, as suggested, may pose certain
difficulties when they become involved in litigation."' In considering the Ex-
change Service, prototype of nonappropriated funds, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that exchanges are "integral parts of the War Department, share in ful-
207 E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2105 (1970) (employee definitions); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1970)(jurisdiction of courts); and 42 U.S.C. § 410(a) (6) (B) (iv) (old age benefits) and §
1701(a)(3) (1970) (workmen's compensation).
208 Legislative history accompanying Pub. L. No. 91-350, 1970-2 U.S. CoDna CONG. & AD.
NEws, 3478, and see 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1970).
209 See text following note 122 supra.
210 Military personnel so employed may assume official military status under circumstances
requiring positive action to preserve order in a military environment, United States v. Brooks
44 C.M.R. 873 (A.C.M.R. 1971).
211 E.g., Swiff-Train Company v. United States, 443 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1971) and
Pulaski Cab Company v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 955 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
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filling the duties intrusted to it, and partake of whatever immunities it may have
under the Constitution and the federal statutes," though "[t]he government
assumes none of the financial obligations of the exchange."2'12 Regulations gov-
erning the administration of nonappropriated funds uniformly apply the "im-
munity" doctrine to the fund operations."1 3
d. Taxes
1. Federal. Nonappropriated funds are required by regulation to withhold
federal income and to deduct federal employment taxes. Additionally, they are
subject to various federal occupational taxes on wholesale and retail beer and
liquor sales.
2. State and foreign. Under the doctrine of governmental immunity estab-
lished in McCullough v. Maryland,"4 as extended to exchange activities pur-
suant to Standard Oil of California v. Johnson2e 5 NAF activities are regarded as
immune from state and local taxes, except as such immunity is waived by
Congress. 6 State income taxes are withheld pursuant to appropriate agree-
ments with the states. Foreign taxes are not paid unless provided for by federal
treaty or executive agreement."'
e. Alcoholic Beverages
Pursuant to statute and Department of Defense (DOD) directive1 8 com-
prehensive regulations control the sale and use of alcoholic beverages on military
installations. Open messes normally provide facilities (which include package
store adjuncts) for the sale of liquor to authorized patrons. Military policy pre-
scribes cooperation with duly constituted civil regulatory agencies without con-
ceding a legal obligation to submit to state control.219 Liquor transactions can
generate complicated legal issues, depending upon the origin of shipment (within
or without the state), the nature of federal jurisdiction vis-4-vis state authority,
and reasonableness of regulatory procedures, to mention but a few potentials for
controversy. The Supreme Court has upheld reasonable state regulatory pro-
visions even as to shipments in interstate commerce, to prevent unlawful diversion
of liquor."'
A district court recently epitomized the fundamental legal issue in such cases
as one which requires the judiciary to harmonize the constitutional grant to
212 And therefore were entitled to an exemption provided for the United States "or any
department thereof," by a California motor fuel tax statute. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson,
316 U.S. 481 (1942); cf., Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 '(1963), holding in part
that state milk regulations applied to sales from certain nonappropriated funds.
213 E.g., Army Reg. 230-1 paras. 1-3a, 1-48, changes I & 3 (1968).
214 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819).
215 316 U.S. 481 (1942).
216 E.g., 4 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
217 Army Reg. 230-1 para. 1-49, change 3 (1968).
218 50 U.S.C. App. § 473 (1970); DOD Dir. 1330.15, 4 May 1964.
219 At least, not without appropriate consideration at high departmental levels.
220 Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944). See MrraARY AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 93-95
for additional issues and cases. See also Johnson v. Yellow Cab Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944);
Maynard & Child, Inc. v. Shearer, 290 S.W.2d 790 (Ky. 1956).
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Congress (to make rules for governing the armed services and to legislate regard-
ing lands purchased for military purposes) with the XXI amendment's prohibi-
tion against transporting or importing intoxicating liquors into a state for delivery
or use therein in violation of state law.221 In that case, the court decided, inter
alia, that the constitutional grants were diminished by the amendment as to
packaged liquor transactions made on federal enclaves for unrestricted use and
consumption thereof outside a military base.
f. Tort Liability
Statutory compensation. 2 is applicable as an exclusive remedy for injuries
received in the course of employment2 2 and the Government is thereby relieved
of liability from suit by nonappropriated fund employees for such injuries.
After early efforts to challenge application of the Federal Tort Claims Act
to nonappropriated funds24 the Government acceded to the force of judicial
views in United States v. Holcombe225 and other cases to the effect that a non-
appropriated fund is a "federal agency" for FTGA purposes. Even prior to
Holcombe, Army NAF activities were directed to cancel public liability insurance
in favor of a self-insurer program financed by the NAF system.
A peculiar facet of NAF tort litigation highlighted two decisions which
denied government liability for flying club incidents. In both cases, suit was
brought by plaintiffs injured by planes piloted by "members" of the respective
clubs, and two appellate courts agreed that the members were not employees
within the contemplation of the FTCA.2 28 Mere status of membership, however,
may not be determinative, as the operative facts may show a member also as an
employee under particular circumstances.2 2
Army policy pertaining to claims caused by NAF activities is broader than
FTCA coverage, as the applicable regulations provide for administrative settle-
ment of all tort claims caused by NAF activities. Thus the tort of a mere "mem-
ber" (as opposed to an employee), excluded by FTCA, may be covered by the
NAF plan.
g. Contracts
As in the area of tort law, government counsel were able to persuade the
courts that nonappropriated funds are not equivalent to the United States but
221 United States v. State Tax Comm'n of Mississippi, 340 F. Supp. 903 (S.D. Miss., 1972).
222 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970).
223 5 U.S.C. § 8173 (1970). For a critical analysis of such exclusivity, see Thornock,
Exclusive Remedy Provision of the Federal Employees Compensation Act-Fact or Fiction, 42
MILITARY L. Rlv. 1 (1968).
224 For analysis of the early administrative determinations and judicial decisions involved,
see Gerwig, Federal Tort Liability for Nonappropriated Fund Activities, 10 MILITARY L. Rxv.
204 (1960) and, for a more recent survey, Dahlinger, Tort Liability of Nonappropriated Fund
Activities, 50 MILITARY L. Rxv. 33 (1970).
225 277 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1960), followed in Rizzuto v. United States, 298 F.2d 748 (10th
Cir. 1961). See also DahlIinger, supra note 224, at 51 n. 80 for additional cases. Cf., Gradall
v. United States, 329 F.2d 960 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
226 Brucker v. United States, 338 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937
(1965); United States v. Hainline, 315 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1963).
227 See Dahlinger, supra note 224, at 56.
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are nonetheless entitled to sovereign immunity from suit based on contractual
rights and obligations. Though such ambivalence ultimately was rejected in the
tort cases, the judiciary generally has accommodated the rationale for contract
liability, albeit somewhat reluctantly.22 Regulations permit administrative settle-
ment of contract disputes, but (except as to exchange contracts, ante) judicial
review is not expressly provided for.
Lack of certain judicial remedy for any contract obligation not payable out
of appropriated funds led to consideration and passage in 1970 of an amendment
to the Tucker Act which granted federal court jurisdiction over contract claims
against exchange activities."s The proposed legislation contemplated inclusion
of all NAF activities. Analysis of the intended coverage, however, disclosed some
problems lurking behind the facade of NAF agencies: (1) Since many NAF
organizations are not actually self-supporting, judgment costs in some cases would
be imposed on the taxpayers; (2) serious definitional questions might unduly
expand reasonable limits of government liability; and (3) limited data concern-
ing all nonappropriated funds made undesirable specific legislation for what is
viewed by some as a veritable unexplored branch of government operations.
Under the circumstances, limiting amendments produced the expansion of juris-
diction over contract claims only for exchange-type activities, presumably because




Still another species of miscellaneous organizations found on military instal-
lations (some regularly, others from time to time or occasionally) are private
associations.23 0 Among such are those which have no true legal kinship to the
military, though they may be composed (in part or in whole) of military person-
nel on active duty or retired or veterans of the armed forces or their families and
may perform morale, recreational, or welfare missions at or near military sites.
Because they may be authorized space, logistical support and other privileges,
in varying degrees, which seem to impart an aura of military affiliation, they may
be mistakenly regarded as part of the military establishment.
Classic examples of such bodies include societies such as the American
National Red Cross, Boy Scouts of America, Big Brothers of America, Civil Air
Patrol, Disabled American Veterans, and the American Legion. They, including
228 Borden v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 873, 878-880 (Ct. C1. 1953); Kyer v. United
States, 369 F.2d 714, 719 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Swiff-Train Company v. United States, 314 F. Supp.
665 (W. D. Texas, 1970) (declining to follow Borden "and its progeny"), but reversed
(primarily on the strength of PL 91-350), 443 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1971). For additional
cases, see MiLITARY AFFAMS, supra note 1, at 164. Cf., a successful action by the Government
to recover under contract between an exchange and its concessionaire, United States v. Stevens
Enterprises, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 411 (S.D. Miss. 1960).
229 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1970). For legislative history of Pub. L. no. 91-350, see
1970-2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws, 3477.
230 For legal considerations of private associations generally, see Developments of the Law-judicial Control of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. Rnv. 983 (1963).
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others, are chartered under Title 36 of the United States Code but congressional
control normally consists essentially of incorporation and periodic reporting
requirements. Similarly, if they are accorded space and other administrative
and logistical support at a military installation, official supervision over private
associations is limited to consent for presence (to include any conditions attached
to the giving of such consent). Such entities normally cannot subject the United
States to legal liability for their activities.
b. Other
Other groups frequently existing either by virtue of incorporation or in-
formal organization include community service groups such as chambers of com-
merce and similar business associations, Kiwanis, Lions, and Rotary, as well as
civic and church alliances, all of which may become involved, on a consensual
basis, with the military. Like the earlier groups mentioned, they are neither de
facto nor de jure components of the military establishment, even when conduct-
ing permissive activities on a military base.
Still another subdivision of the miscellaneous unofficial groups (normally
not incorporated) consists of what might be regarded as quasi-military associa-
tions. Such informal organizations include wives' clubs, hunting and fishing clubs,
youth groups, thrift shops, nursery services, and benevolent or charitable funds.
Characteristically, they offer auxiliary services or benefits to the military com-
munity and are managed by military or civilian personnel and their dependents
(frequently on a volunteer or no-pay basis), although "outside" persons may be
employed, depending on the available resources and scope of operations. The
actions of an individual on behalf of private associations must not impinge upon
or conflict with his official capacity, if any, as an officer, employee, or agent of
the Government.
c. Legal Aspects
If a nonappropriated fund is an anomaly at law, then the private association
operating on a military post is at least another degree removed from easy legal
identification. A good example of the problem of classification is found in Scott
v. United States.231 There the Government was sued because of an alleged tort of
a hunt club permitted by a post commander to use some land for its purposes in
a remote part of the post.2 The suit was predicated upon pleadings identifying
the club as a nonappropriated fund and government instrumentality. The district
court did not quibble with the plaintiff's designation of the club as an NAF
activity but it rejected the notion that the club, which was organized as a private
association, could be classified as a government instrumentality, and therefore
found no basis for a suit under the FTCA.23
231 226 F. Supp. 864 (M.D. Ga. 1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 471 "(5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 933 (1965).
232 The club was composed of military personnel and their families who owned horses and
were interested in equestrian activities.
233 Under applicable regulations, private associations clearly are not within the compass of
organizations designated as nonappropriated funds.
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Whatever the corporate genesis of the private association, the primary
distinction between nonappropriated fund and private associations-absence of
military command control-becomes blurred unless the day-to-day operations of
the private group are in fact determined by persons acting in a nonmilitary
capacity.2 3 4
F. Claims
The size and complexity of the United States Army and of its operations
inevitably require an extensive claims system. Military personnel by their in-
dividual actions and some military functions by their very nature cause a great
variety of injuries to others or to their property. Similarly, military personnel and
property are frequently injured or damaged by the conduct of others. Some
military claims functions are peculiar to the armed forces; others are discharged
in common with all other federal departments and agencies. For the Army, the
system is headed by the Secretary, under various statutes which empower him
to promulgate regulations and to designate subordinate officials to exercise ad-
ministrative settlement authority.2
39
1. Against the United States
a. General
Statutory coverage is provided, inter alia, for personnel claims and recovery
actions against third parties,"' claims incident to use of government vehicles,2"'
military and national guard claims, 3 ' foreign claims,' 9 maritime claims,2 4 and
advance payment, 4 ' in addition to other miscellaneous claims.242 Comparison of
the subject matter of the respective statutes sometimes indicates possible over-
lapping, but implementing regulations purport to clarify the precedence of specific
procedures. Thus if a claim appears to be cognizable under more than one
statute, administrative procedures require settlement under only one, which
results in preemption as to any others."
234 In a nonfederal situation, activities of a private association composed of policemen
were so entwined with a city police department which employed them that it was found to be
acting under "color of law" for purposes of a statute barring discriminatory practices, Adams
v. Miami Police Benevolent Assn., 454 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1971), pet. for certiorari filed, 40
U.S.L.W. 3523; cf. Brummitt v. United States, 329 F.2d 966 (Ct. Cl. 1964), '("officers club"
was held not to be an NAF because of absence of fiscal control by the military command ele-
ment involved).
235 DEP'T OF THE ARMy, PAMPHLET 27-162, CLAIMS (1968) [hereinafter cited as CLAIMS];
Army Reg. 27-80, at 18 (1970).
236 31 U.S.C. §§ 240-43, 951-53 (1970).
237 Nonscope of employment cases, 10 U.S.C. § 2737 (1970).
238 Incident to noncombat activities, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2733, 2736 '(1970); 32 U.S.C. § 715
(1970).
239 10 U.S.C. §§ 2734, 2736 (1970); 36 U.S.C. §§ 121, 138b (1970).
240 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752, 781-790 (1970).
241 10 U.S.C. § 2736 (1970).
242 Cases considered under the various statutes are collected in CLAIMS, supra note 235.
243 CLAIMS, supra note 235, at para. 1.3.
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b. Federal Tort Claims
Reference to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 2" is included to reflect
some issues recently considered in the active area of tort litigation. Though all
examples do not involve military cases, their application to military situations may
be relevant under the FTCA requirement that the Government's liability is
determined in accordance with the "law of the place." '245 Since 1966, suit under
the Act has been precluded unless a claim first shall have been presented to the
agency concerned and been finally denied.2
(1) Absolute liability.
A recent Supreme Court decision under the Act, by a 6-2 split, rejected the
theory that the Government may be liable under the doctrine of absolute liability,
notwithstanding that the law of the state involved, e.g., law which renders a
person who creates a sonic boom absolutely liable for any injuries caused
thereby. 47 In so doing, the Supreme Court reinforced Dalehite v. United States248
(Texas City disaster case of 1953 which Justice Stewart described as "severely
criticized" '249) by recalling its lesson that "regardless of State law characteriza-
tion," the Act precludes liability in the absence of negligence or other forms of
misfeasance or nonfeasance.
(2) Administrative claim; prerequisite.
The statutory requirement that an administrative claim be filed before a
civil action is brought against the United States applies even when the plaintiff
instituted original suit in a state court against the federal employee, which suit
was removed to a federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (b) .20
(3) Air traffic control.
Under local law, the proximate cause of the crash of a plane was the pilot's
negligence, which superseded failure of the flight service station operator to give
weather information. 5'
(4) Contribution.
The United States could not in an action against it for injuries caused by
244 Essentially at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1970). For a comprehensive general
analysis of the Act, see JAYSON, H-ANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS (1964). A compilation of
Supreme Court decisions under the Act appears in Gerwig & Gantt, Indexed Bibliography to
the Federal Tort Claims Act-19651969, 29 FFD. B.J. 129, 134 (1969).
245 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
246 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1970).
247 Laird v. Nelns, 406 U.S. 797 (1972), rev'g 442 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1971).
248 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
249 Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 807 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
250 Meeker v. United States, 435 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1970).
251 Black v. United States, 441 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1971).
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ROTC personnel during a state university football game recover contribution
from the state as a joint tortfeasor, since the right of contribution under the local
law was derivative of the state's liability to the injured party. Therefore under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the state could not be held liable to the
injured party."2
(5) Damages.
A child struck by a government truck could, under the applicable state law
and FTCA, recover damages for pain and suffering, even though the Govern-
ment had previously reimbursed her parents for medical expenses.2"3
(6) Incident to service.
(a) Dependents' nonderivative action.
The Feres incident-to-service doctrine barred suit by the wife and children
of a deceased serviceman for damages resulting from loss of their husband and
father caused by alleged malpractice of military physicians and hospital predi-
cated upon local law authorizing a separate and independent cause of action.25
(b) Travel in private car.
Recovery for death of a serviceman injured in an accident while traveling
in a private automobile between bases under military group travel orders was
barred since he was acting in the line of his duty, incident to his military ser-
vice.2 5 5
(7) Limitation of action, notice.
The statutory bar of actions begun more than six months after agency
mailed notice of denial of administrative claim precluded suit filed more than
six months after notice of denial was mailed to plaintiff's attorney, even though
the attorney had since died and neither he nor the plaintiff received actual
notice.2"6
(8) Scope of employment.
(a) Deviation.
The United States could not be held liable for injuries sustained by service-
252 Hill v. United States, 453 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1972).
253 Stokes v. United States, 444 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1971).
254 De Font v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910
(1972). The incident-to-service doctrine was formulated in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135 (1950).
255 Karneges v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 3599 (9th Cir., Jan. 17, 1971), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 920 (1972).
256 Childers v. United States, 442 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971).
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man's infant daughter as result of his negligence in automobile accident during
trip from California to Tennessee (pursuant to transfer orders), where the acci-
dent occurred in Colorado, 300 miles north of direct east-west route, it being
serviceman's independent and personal motive to use such route to visit Las
Vegas and then relatives in Philadelphia.2
57
(b) Personal use of government vehicle.
A federally employed VISTA worker assisting migrant workers in south-
eastern Oklahoma and having 24-hour use of a government car was not acting
within the scope of her employment when, after being granted leave, she was
involved in an automobile collision while driving the car to catch a plane for
a vacation at her home in the East.2"'
2. By the United States
a. General
The subject of "Government Claims" is a two-sided concept that encom-
passes prosecution of claims as well as defense thereof. The Constitution provides
that the Congress has the right to dispose of property belonging to the United
States.2" The right of the United States to assert a cause of action for tortious
damage to its property rights long ago was recognized by the Supreme Court.
211
Until recently, administrative settlement of claims owed to the Government
could be effected by the agencies generally only by way of collection in full.
Any settlement less than the actual amount of the claims would have reflected
a disposition of a portion of the Government's cause of action, an action requiring
congressional authority. General inflexibility of federal claims collection prac-
tices led to enactment in 1966 of the Federal Claims Collection Act.2  Under
that grant of authority, heads of agencies (and their designees) are permitted to
compromise claims in favor of the United States not exceeding $20,000 or to
cause collection action to be terminated or suspended, pursuant to joint standards
of the Attorney General and the Comptroller General.62 A recently enacted
statute of limitation normally requires actions for money damages founded on
tort to be brought within three years, though the period extends to six years in
some cases.
263
257 McSwain v. United States, 422 F.2d 1086 (3d Cir. 1970). J. Adams noted the judicial
dilemma facing federal judges arising from the rule that liability is required to be determined
by the law of respondant superior of the state in which the act or omission occurs, Williams v.
United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1957): "there cannot be a state case directly in point"; and
that, as a practical matter, the problem has been resolved by the dubious formula of applying
"the most analogous state law." 422 F.2d at 1088.
258 Erwin v. United States, 445 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 (1971).
259 U.S. Const., art IV, § 3.
260 Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 241 (1850).
261 31 U.S.C. §§ 951-953 (1970).
262 4 C.F.R. § 101 et seq. (1972); Army Reg. 27-41 (1972).
263 28 U.S.C. §§ 2415, 2416 (1970).
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b. Recovery of Medical Care Costs
Under the Medical Care Recovery Act,2 ' whenever the United States is au-
thorized or required by law to furnish medical care because of injuries suffered
by a person under circumstances creating a tort liability upon some third person,
the United States may recover from the third person the costs of the care fur-
nished. Recovery may be accomplished by an independent action at law, by
intervention in an action brought by or for the benefit of the victim, or by settle-
ment or compromise.2 65 The Act reflected delayed congressional response to a
clear invitation by the Supreme Court for the Congress to enact remedial legisla-
tion to delineate the Government's right of recovery." 6
The statutory "circumstances" posited by the Act in practice depend upon
interpretation of applicable state law. For example, a recent appellate decision
affirmed a trial court's summary judgment, under which intrafamilial and inter-
spousal immunity laws were deemed to bar recovery by the Government for
medical expenses paid on behalf of a member of the Armed Forces and his chil-
dren who were injured by his wife's negligent driving.267 In a slightly different
context, another circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of the Government's
action against a husband in the military and his insurer to recover the cost of
medical care furnished to a wife who was injured by the negligent driving of her
husband. Notwithstanding the district court's view that a wife's claim for medi-
cal care expenses under Louisiana law (unlike her claim for personal injuries)
is a community claim, which must be brought by the husband, the Court of
Appeals ruled the Government's right to be independent and not merely that
of a subrogee 65
Because it is limited to the prosecution of tort claims under the Act, the
Government could not recover from a workmen's compensation insurer for the
value of hospital and medical services furnished by the Veterans Administration
to a veteran who made no assignment to the VA. "69
G. Procurement
1. General
The law of contracts pertaining to military procurement is inextricably
interwoven with complex government appropriation processes. Government poli-
cies affecting small business or labor surplus firms, domestic products, labor
standards, equal opportunity requirements, or environmental protection may be
directly influenced by government procurement expenditures. ° Manifestly, ref-
264 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653 (1970).
265 SOLO, supra note 1, at 100.
266 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), denying a preexisting right
of the Government (absent appropriate congressional provision) to effect recovery of medical
costs resulting from third-party tort injuries inflicted upon military personnel.
267 United States v. Moore, 40 U.S.L.W. 2758 (3d Cir., Apr. 27, 1972). Dissenting, J.
Kalodner would construe the Government's right as independent and unimpaired by the vagaries
of local immunity laws.
268 United States v. Haynes, 445 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971).
269 Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Co. v. Barnett, 445 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1971).
270 For an example of litigation arising out of governmental policies requiring employment
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erence to government procurement here can reflect little more than a fleeting
glimpse of some of the myriad problems in this area of the law. While funda-
mental contract law principles remain inherent in government contract-procure-
ment transactions, particular statutory and regulatory requirements add a special
dimension to the relevant law. As a consequence consideration of military con-
tracts involves multitudinous boiler-plate clauses which present difficulties nor-
mally not encountered in ordinary commercial contract matters. 1
Generally, the legal effect of a government contract is governed by federal
law,272 giving due regard to local interests and institutions. State law may be
applied when the federal interest in the particular controversy is not over-
riding.2
Although a wide variety of types of contracts are required by the complexity
and scope of government procurement operations, basic forms involve variations
of either fixed price or cost reimbursement contractual arrangements. Fixed price
type contracts frequently provide for adjustable prices based on an identified
contingency, while cost reimbursement contracts may provide for payment of
only a portion of the contractor's allowable costs. Other modifications entail
particular incentives to stimulate better products or service or to reduce time re-
quired for compliance.
2. Remedies
Formal advertising entails solicitation of bids by the Government, submis-
sion of sealed bids by qualified suppliers, public opening at a set hour and record-
ing of bids by the Government, and award "to the responsible bidder whose bid
conforms to the invitation and will be the most advantageous to the United
States."" 5 Although the procedure emphasizes formal practices and rigid ad-
herence to the rules, courts will intervene to correct procedural irregularities
only when its "invalidity is clear,"27 or upon a showing of flagrant disregard for
the regularity of contracting procedures. 7 And, in any event, a contracting
officer 7 has no authority to enter into contracts which are prejudicial to the
of minority workers under governmental policy on federally financed construction projects
(Labor Department's "Philadelphia Plan"), see Contractors Assoc. of Eastern Pennsylvania v.
Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971), and see 42
Op. ATT'y GEN. No. 37 (1969). For a broad analysis, see Miller, Government Contracts and
Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry, 41 VA. L. REv. 27 (1955).
271 Even when the boiler plate is omitted, the Armed Services Procurement Regulations,
having the force of law in many (if not most) situations, may be construed to incorporate a
regulatory provision into a contract that makes no specific reference thereto. G. L. Christian
and Assoc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963). For
recent consideration of the problem as it relates to government warranties and disclaimers, see
Tracy, Warranty and Disclaimer in Government Personal Property Sales Contracts, 56
MrLiTARY L. RBv. 107 (1972).
272 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
273 United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
274 Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
275 10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1970).
276 John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 440 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 931 (1964).
277 National Cash Register Co. v. Richardson, 324 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1971).
278 Essentially, the person executing the contract on behalf of the Government.
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interest of the United States." 9 Negotiation, on the other hand, embodies the
essence of bargaining for the best terms available to the Government. Negotiation
is permitted, however, only in special circumstances,"' including national emer-
gencies and public exigencies.
Mistakes in bidding provide an unending source of litigation, notwithstand-
ing the general rule that a contractor must bear the consequences of a unilateral
mistake, unless the contracting officer knew or should have known of the existence
of the mistake when the bid was accepted. 8'
For many years, the statutory requirements of competitive bidding were
construed to exist for the benefit of the United States, not for bidders.282 In
1970, however, an unsuccessful bidder was granted standing to sue the Govern-
ment, 8 3 though more recently another court reverted to the earlier rule reflecting
a bidder's lack of direct legal interest in the Government's procurement process."'
A standard disputes procedure is provided in all government contracts
under which the contracting officer is authorized to decide a dispute raised by
the contractor. Such decision is final unless "fradulent [sic] or capricious or
arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not sup-
ported by substantial evidence." 2 r
Unless intermediate appeal is provided by contract, appeals are submitted
to the secretary of the department. The Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
peals is authorized to act as the secretarial representative for the determination
of appeals under the disputes clause. The Board's jurisdiction is limited to
remedies under specific contract provisions and does not extend to a controversy
over broad aspects of contract violation. The Government has on occasion
asserted a right to obtain judicial review coextensive with that of the contractor.
In resolving that issue, the Supreme Court decided that no government agency
(including the Justice Department and the General Accounting Office) may
challenge or block, absent fraud or bad faith, an award to a contractor made
under the terms of the disputes clause, including disposition by the agency appeals
board.8 6
Before seeking judicial relief, a contractor must pursue the disputes clause
remedy, unless it is clearly inadequate or unavailable . 2  Under the latter cir-
cumstances, jurisdiction is vested in the United States Court of Claims under
the Tucker Act.288 That court has evinced a strong penchant to consider evi-
dence de novo in contrast to the usual federal district courts' policy to limit
279 Lombard Corp. v. Resor, 321 F. Supp. 687, 692 (D.D.C. 1970).
280 The exceptions are specified at 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1970). Various fluctuations reflecting
shifts of government policy from formal advertising to negotiation and the factors involved
are traced in Von Baur, Fifty Years of Government Contract Law, 29 FED. BAR J. 305 (1970).
281 Allied Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 310 F.2d 945 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
282 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Corp., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
283 Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
284 Gary Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Tex. 1972), expressly
declining to follow Scanwell. Id. at 477.
285 Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1970), which prevented the use of clauses
allowing administrative decisions on questions of law to be final.
286 S & B Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1 (1972), rev'g 433 F.2d 1373 (Ct.
Cl. 1970).
287 United States v. Grace & Sons, 384 U.S. 424 (1966).
288 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).
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review to the administrative record. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's con-
firmance of the latter practice,289 the Court of Claims has continued, in certain
circumstances, to give de novo consideration.2 9 Apparently clarification of the
scope of review must await additional judicial or legislative developments.
It is clear that the disputes clause does not extend to breach of contract
claims not redressable under other clauses of the contract.2"' Such a test has
been described as "very difficult" to apply in cour2 92 because it depends upon
adjustment clauses employed by the agency, together with the procurement
policy and practice of the agency in applying those clauses, and whether the
agency remedy is fully equivalent to the judicial remedy it purports to replace,
under the Bianchi rule.29 3
Finally, a reminder of the anomalous legal status of nonappropriated
funds " is reflected by a bidder's protest to the General Accounting Office
(GAO) concerning an award by a general welfare fund for construction of
temporary lodging quarters. The invitation for bids indicated that the welfare
fund was a government instrumentality but that no appropriated funds would
become due or be paid to the contractor. The GAO ruled that it could not
make an authoritative decision in the matter since the contract did not involve




The military criminal law system (the Uniform Code of Military Justice
since 1950) rarely is without its critics. Indeed, contemporary legal literature
abounds with a clamor of charges alleging abuses within the armed forces as
amounting to abridgment of constitutional rights of military personnel, espe-
cially in the lower ranks.2"
289 United States v. Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
290 E.g., Commerce Intel. Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 81 (0t. Cl. 1964), Kaiser Indus.
Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 322 (Ct. Cl. 1965), Wingate Constr. Co. v. United States,
164 Ct. Cl. 131 (1964); cf., Morrison Knudsen Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 833 (Ct CI.
1965).
291 United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
292 Spector, Public Contract Claims Procedures-A Perspective, 30 FED. B.J. 1, 7 (1971).
293 United States v. Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
294 See text accompanying note 208 supra.
295 2 THE ARmy LAwYER, Mar., 1972, at 22.
* Valuable research assistance was furnished for this Part by Cpt. Arnold A. Vickery,
JAGC, U. S. Army.
296 The volunteer army of critics is extensive. A few examples are given to suggest the
tenor of criticism against the authority of the armed forces generally and the UCMJ in
particular: BARNES, PAWNS: THE PLIGHT OF THE CITIZEN SOLDmR (1972); M. MCCARTHY,
MEDINA (1972); NATIONAL LAWYERS GuIr,, MILITARY COUNSELING MANUAL: A GuiDE
TO MILITARY LAW AND PROCEDURE FOR GI's (1970); FRIEDMAN & NEUBORN, UNQUESTIONING
OBEDIENCE TO THE PRESIDENT (1972); R. RivxIN: GI RIGHTS AND ARMY JUSTICE: THE
DRAFTEE'S Gum TO MILITARY LIFE AND LAW (1970); R. SHERRILL, MLrrAY JUSTICE IS TO
JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO MUSIC (1970); Military justice on Trial, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 31, 1970 (cover story); Scarupa, How Just Is Military justice? Baltimore Sun, Apr. 23,
1972; Remcho, Military juries: Constitutional Analysis and the Need for Reform, 47 IND. L.J.
193 (1972); Note, Dissenting Servicemen and the First Amendment, 58 Geo. L.J. 534 (1970);
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... the basic reason for this outpouring of articles is to be found in the
sensational claims concerning alleged severity of court-martial sentences
and inefficiency and injustice of military courts. By the close of the war,
military justice had become a matter of public controversy. Most of the lay
writing and some of the legal writing on the subject was ill-informed and
prejudiced. There is no doubt, however, that these writings were the basic
cause of much of the congressional and legal furor which followed.
Prompted by a variety of reasons, and not always clearly aware of the
problems of command discipline, some of the writers took a hostile ap-
proach.
29 7
The quoted commentary, seemingly a timely reflection of the current scene, was
published almost twenty years ago and pertained to a surge of periodical litera-
ture in the field of military law during and after World War II. In retrospect,
it serves to substantiate Thomas Carlyle's proposition that the present is the
"sum-total of the whole Past." This is not to suggest that constructive criticism
is neither necessary nor proper.29" But complaint and indictment must be tem-
pered with thoughtful analysis and reasoned judgment, based on reliable factual
information, if improved procedures are to be developed in the light of relevant
perspective. Significant aspects of that perspective may be illumined by reference
to the record of the past.
Reform of military justice policy historically can be expected to follow
expansion of military forces occasioned by large-scale combat. In that regard,
however, change in military law tends to parallel the dynamics of law in general
which seek to accomplish orderly accommodation of changing societal objectives.
One needs only to reread the dusty ordinances of a 12th-century British mon-
arch to be reminded of punishments for the military generally acceptable under
early notions of summary criminal justice, yet which clearly would be intolerable
under contemporary penal philosophy.29
9
The keystone for the separate system of criminal law in the military is,
of course, the constitutional provision under which the Congress was vested
with the power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces." ' Under that authority, the Congress in 1950 enacted
Sherman, Military Injustice, TRIAL Feb.-Mar. 1968, at 21; and Wulf, Commentary: A Soldier's
First Amendment Rights: The Art of Formally Granting and Practically Suppressing, 18 WAYNE
L. REv. 665 (1972).
297 Mott, Hartnett, & Morton, A Survey of the Literature of Military Law-A Selective
Bibliography, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 365 (1953).
298 For illustrative constructive recent symposiums by nonmilitary agencies, see 31 FED.
B.J. 1 (1972) 10; Am. C~aRi. L. Rav. 1 (1971); 22 HASTINGS L.J. 201 (1971); 2 MMNE L.
REv. 3 (1970); Symposium, Beyond the Military Justice Act of 1968: Proposed Amendments
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 7 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PaoB. 278 (1971).
299 E.g., "Whoever shall slay a man on ship-board, he shall be bound to the dead man and
thrown into the sea. If he shall slay him on land he shall be bound to the dead man and
buried in the earth. If any one shall be convicted... of having drawn out a knife with which
to strike another . . .he shall lose his hand." Ordinance of Richard I-A.D. 1190, to govern
military personnel engaged in the Holy Land crusade, reprinted in W. WINTHROP, supra note
5, at 903. Still earlier precedent is found in the scourges, stonings, and death penalties without
trial prescribed in the ancient Book of Leviticus, as well as even older provision for mutilations
and enforced suicides under the Egyptian legal system. 1 J. WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE
WoRD's LEGAL SYsTMs 42 (1928). The Supreme Court recently reviewed forms of punish-
ment sanctioned by society from the beginning of civilization in considering modem constitu-
tional implications of -the traditional death penalty. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
300 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Cognate provisions include, from art. I, § 8, the
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a single "Uniform Code of Military Justice" (UGMJ). °. for the armed forces,
consisting of the Army, the Navy (including the Marine Corps), the Air Force,
and (except when operating as a part of the Navy) the Coast Guard.
When the UCMJ was enacted, the nation was approaching its 175th
anniversary. But regulations for the government of the separate armed forces
had been continuously in force even prior to the Declaration of Independence.
Actually, our system of military jurisprudence has been traced to the earliest
days of feudal law introduced by the Teutons to the Romans in the first century
B.C., from whence it was carried into Europe and, in particular, to England
in 1066 by William the Conqueror. The American military code also claims
its heritage from French, German, Dutch, Swedish, and Russian sources, as well.
In 1689 the English Parliament entered the field of military law with the British
Mutiny Act, in contrast to previous British military rules, which were proclaimed
exclusively by the authority of the king and normally operated only during
wartime conditions. That Act, in turn, was followed by a series of successive
mutiny acts, as well as British Articles, enacted by Parliament,"°2 leaving no
doubt that our military code is predicated upon a history of military criminal
law which originated separate and apart from, and in addition to, the common
law, equity, canon, and admiralty systems of law. 03
The "original" American Articles of War, consisting of fifty-three provisions,
were adopted by the Provisional Congress of Massachusetts Bay on April 5,
1775, for observance by Massachusetts troops, the colonial congress having
seriously considered "... the duty [owed] ... to the King" in anticipation of
having "to prevent or repel" attempts by Great Britain to force compliance
with "cruel and oppressive Acts of the British Parliament .... ,,s04
On June 30, the second Continental Congress, after resolving on June
14 that a military force be raised to "march and join the Army near Boston,"
adopted a set of articles numbering sixty-nine, prefaced by a preamble reciting
congressional power to declare war and to make rules for captures on land and water (cl. 11),
to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy (cl. 12, 13), to organize and call
forth the militia (cl. 15, 16); and, from art. II, § 2, cl. 1, the President's role as Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy and, from Section 3, his power to commission all officers. The
UCMJ is implemented by regulations published in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1969 (Rev. ed.) [hereinafter cited as MOM, 1969 (Rev.)] published as Executive
Order 11476, June 19, 1969. Each of the services, in turn, has issued supplementary depart-
mental regulatory provisions governing the administration of military justice.
301 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970). For legislative history, see S. REP. No. 486, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1949); H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1949). The UCMJ expressly
repealed the Articles of War and the Articles for the Government of the Navy. Perhaps the
outstanding feature of the UCMJ was its provision for a Court of Military Appeals-now the
United States Court of Military Appeals, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1970), as the court of last resort
in the system of military criminal law. As a "civilian" court (consisting of three judges ap-
pointed from civilian life by the President, upon advice and consent of the Senate, for fifteen
years), it reflected the traditional American concept of civilian control over the military and
also a special effort to combat the specter of military "command control," which loomed large
in the consideration of post-World War II reforms.
302 The early statutory history of military law is related in detail in W. AYcOCK AND S.
WURFEL, MILITARY LAw UNDR THE UNnzoR.m CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, 3-9 (1955), which
cites additional sources, including W. WINTHROP, supra note 5. For example, celebrated war
articles were issued in 1378 (by the French), 1487 (Germans), 1532 (Charles V), 1590
(Netherlands), 1651 and 1665 (Louis XIV), 1691 (Gustavus Adolphus), 1715 (Peter the
Great), and 1768 (Maria Theresa).
303 See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
304 W. WINTHROP, supra note 5, at 947.
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the causes which had induced "His Majesty's most faithful subjects" in the
colonies to assume a defensive attitude."0 5 The articles, based in part on the
Massachusetts provisions, though more nearly in accord with the British Articles
of 1774, 6 were drafted by a committee appointed on June 14 consisting of
George Washington and four others"'r "to prepare rules and regulations for the
government of the Army." Washington was appointed General of the Army
on June 15. Sixteen articles were added on November 7, 1775.
Modifications of the 1775 articles suggested by General Washington were
submitted by his judge advocate, Col. William Tudor, to a congressional commit-
tee appointed to prepare a new military code. The Continental Congress enacted
the articles on September 20, 1776, which were notable in that they referred to the
respective Armies of the United States while no mention was made of the British
Crown. 0 ' That act completed the transformation of the British military system
into an American institution. Moreover, John Marshall, who, at twenty-two,
became the Army Deputy Judge Advocate in 1777, helped shape the American
military law a decade before the establishment of the United States Supreme
Court and twenty years before he would become Chief Justice of the United
States.30 9
The articles of 1776 were amended in 1777 and again in 1786." After
the adoption of the Constitution, the first Congress, recognizing the existing
military establishment, provided that the troops should be governed "by the
rules and articles of war which have been established by the United States in
Congress assembled, or by such rules and articles of war as may hereafter by law
be established." " ' Except for minor amendments, they were not revised until
after the Civil War. .2 and some of the Indian Wars, in 1874," ' though no
fundamental changes were effected. Aside from the elimination of some obsolete
material in 1916,14 one qualified observer offers evidence that the British articles
of 1774 had been assimilated into the American system of military criminal law
without much alteration in substance. 15 Another revision occurred in 1920,16
305 Id., 21, 953.
306 DAVIs, supra note 5, at 341.
307 It may be noted that .three members of the five-man committee (Adams, Jefferson, and
Livingston) also served on the committee responsible for drafting the Declaration of Independ-
ence.
308 W. WINTHROP, supra note 5, at 961.
309 W. Aycocic & S. WURFEL, supra note 302, at 10-11.
310 DAVIS, supra note 5, at 342.
311 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. XXV § 4, 1 Stat. 96.
312 Acts of the Congress of the Confederate States of America pertaining to military courts
and extending jurisdiction to offenses then cognizable "under the Rules and Articles of war and
the customs of war," together with subsequent amendments thereto, appear in W. WINTHROP,
supra note 5, at 1006-1009.
313 W. WINTHROP, supra note 5, app. XIII. One commentator observes that the 1874
Articles reflected an attempt to draw "patches" applied to the existing Articles during the war
years into the framework of the Military Code as permanent legislation. Hansen, Judicial
Functions for the Commander, 41 MILITARY L. REv. 1, 13 (1968).
314 Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 650.
315 The late Prof. Edmund C. Morgan, Jr., chairman of the Committee of the Secretary of
Defense which drafted the UCMJ, credited the observation to Major General E. H. Crowder,
a former judge Advocate General of the Army, in connection with congressional hearings
which led to the 1916 changes. Prof. Morgan also noted that the Articles for the Government of
the Navy covering substantially the same period of time reflected the fundamental theory and
substance of the British naval articles of 1749 (from which John Adams formulated the
early American naval articles). Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military
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reflecting changes considered desirable as a result of World War I experiences
and, with minor amendments in 1937 and 1942, the 1920 articles governed the
Army throughout World War II. Final amendments to those articles, prior
to the consolidation of military criminal laws for all the armed services in the
UCMJ occurred in 1948, based upon World War II experience and recom-
mendations of the Vanderbilt Committee.3
1 7
The need for a separate system of military criminal law was recognized
centuries ago. It may be helpful to summarize the traditional rationale for such
a system to permit appraisal of its relevance to the contemporary scene.
Though discipline is not a popular subject, it is a necessary ingredient of
organization and the extent to which it must be developed depends upon partic-
ular institutional objectives to be achieved. For example, if every soldier,
sailor, or airman could, at his own whim, modify or curtail any aspect of his
training or combat tasks, or, indeed, could quit the service at his option, it is
obvious that no effective fighting force could be maintained. In addition, char-
acteristic mobility of military elements precludes reasonable use of civilan judi-
cial procedures to cope with violations of the military code. Finally, there is
need for a uniform system of law applicable to all servicemen everywhere-a
system patently unavailable in the civilian community, especially in areas out-
side the territorial boundaries of the United States."'8
It should be remembered also that action under the UCMJ is only one of
the procedures available to a military commander in handling disciplinary prob-
lems. Commanders, by instinct, training, and doctrine, are capable of using
primary attributes of leadership-whether psychological or administrative-
to motivate their personnel. High-principled leadership can inspire personal
loyalty and pride of accomplishment, despite difficulties inherent in specific
military tasks and missions. It is only when "all else fails" that the commander,
justice, 6 VAND. L. Rxv. 169 (1953). Symposium, Professor Morgan and the Drafting of the
Code, 28 MrLITARY L. Rav. 1 (1965). (A reprint of the Vanderbilt article appears in this same
issue.)
316 Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, § 52, 41 Stat. 787.
317 Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, §§ 201-49, 62 Stat. 627 (commonly known as the
Elston Act). The committee was formally designated the War Department Advisory Com-
mittee on Military Justice, headed by the late Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt of New
Jersey. That committee's report included the observation that, under existing Articles of War,
"the innocent are almost never convicted and the guilty seldom acquitted." W. AYcocK and
S. WURPEL, supra note 302, at 14. The 1948 legislation also changed the Judge Advocate
General's Department in the Army to the Judge Advocate General's Corps. The UCMJ, in
turn, was amended by the Military Justice Act of 1968, which principally redesignated the
law officer of a court-martial as a "military judge" (purportedly giving him functions and
powers more closely allied to those of federal district judges), increased availability of legally
qualified counsel to represent accused in courts-martial, gave accused the right to trial by a
military judge in noncapital cases, redesignated boards of review as "courts of military review,"
and increased the independence of courts-martial officials from unlawful influence by con-
vening authorities and other commanders. Act. of Oct. 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat.
1335, amending 10 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1964). See S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Gong., 2d
Sess. (1968); H.R. REP. No. 1481, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The provision therein for
election by the accused to be tried by the military judge alone has become increasingly popular
until it now appears that a vast majority of accused are choosing to be tried before the judge
alone. Hunt, Sentencing in the Military, 10 Am. Cpam. L. Rav. 107, 113 (1971).
318 The exigencies of military discipline require a special system of military courts for cases
arising in the land and naval forces, as prescribed by the fifth amendment's exceptions to
civilian criminal procedures of indictment and trial by jury. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S.
258, 261 (1969). See SOLO, supra note 1, Criminal Law, pt. B, at 7-9.
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by necessity, may find it necessary to consider disciplinary powers under the
UCMJ. Even then, he is not completely free to exercise discretion. For the
size of a modem army and its influence upon the civilian community expose
the commander to the reaction of external agencies to a degree hitherto un-
imaginable in the annals of military administration. Public reaction, including
legal challenge, must be reckoned with, not as a necessary deterrent to proper
exercise of discretion, but as a forcible reminder that decisions will be closely
scrutinized for rigid adherence to applicable law and policy. 19
This, then-in broad terms-presents a background of tradition and en-
vironment against which a few selected aspects of the disciplinary system now
embodied in the UCMJ32 ° will be examined briefly. To that background is
added the reminder (frequently overlooked by strident critics of the system)
that official figures tend to place alleged aggravated court-martial activity in a
relatively reasonable focus. For example, Army general courts-martial during
recent years have occurred at a rate of less than .20 per 1000 men per month, 2'
which equates to about one general court-martial for 5000 men per month. To
sharpen the picture still more, a city of 5000 adults which could anticipate but
one trial per month in its court of general criminal jurisdiction should, it seems,
319 SOLO, supra note 1, Criminal Law, pt. B, at 9. Key features of tentative legislative
proposals would remove control of courts-martial from the local commander, in some instances
by establishing independent "court-martial commands" under administrative supervision of the
respective Judge Advocates General. For selected assessment of current proposals, see Sym-
posium, Beyond the Military Justice Act of 1968: Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, supra note 3; Symposium, Military Law, 10 ABI. Cpam. L. REv. 1 (1971);
Wiener, The Perils of Tinkering with Military Justice, ARMY, Nov. 24, 1970, at 22 (published
by the Association of the U.S. Army, a private association).
320 Despite the "uniform" nature of the statutory structure, as in the case of some "civil"
determinations and proceedings mentioned in Part I, departmental rules and customs of the
respective services may produce something less than the anticipated uniformity contemplated
by the lawmakers.
321 Statistics issued by the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General show the following
fluctuations in the monthly average disciplinary rate per 1,000 between 1967-1972: general
court-martial, .12-.20; special court-martial, 1.33-3.42; summary court-martial, .60-1.16; art.
15, 14.6-20.56. The corrected rates for Jan.-Mar. 1972 were: general, .18; special (BCD), .08,
(non-BCD), 1.20; summary 1.12; art. 15, 19.78. Reported in various issues of Judge Advocate
Legal Service and The Army Lawyer.
As indicated previously, criticism of the military criminal law system is not a new
phenomenon, but the extent and force of current disparagement have not been disregarded
by the military. A text designed particularly for use by Army senior commanders suggests that
present criticisms have focused not so much on legal procedures and structure as upon the
human frailties of officers who serve as convening authorities and court members. SOLO, supra
note 1, Criminal Law, pt. B, at 9. A persistent critical theme argues that the average com-
mander is not qualified to discharge judicial functions assigned to him and that court mem-
bers are not really impartial, i.e., they are likely to believe that the command desires a con-
viction and, in effect, that charges really would not have been referred for trial unless the
accused had done something wrong.
These arguments are by no means new, nor are they necessarily true in most cases.
Nevertheless, even if largely unsupported by credible evidence, the arguments generate popular
support and therefore detract from the system's potential effectiveness; hence, the new hand-
book, designed to assist senior commanders in recognizing that the appearance of evil can be
overcome only by studied familiarity with and astute adherence to prescribed procedures
based upon appropriate legal counsel.
For a view that reforms within the court-martial system long preceded similar modifications
in the civil courts (in respect to exclusion of evidence obtained by unreasonable search or by
wiretapping, provision of counsel without cost to accused, warning requirement for military
investigations, effective pretrial discovery, etc.), see remarks of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr. of
North Carolina, in -the U.S. Senate, June 25, 1969. 115 CONG. REc. 17266 (1969) reprinted
in 69-20 JuDGE ADvocATE LEGAL SERVIcE 28.
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be considered as having furnished prima facie evidence of a reasonable commu-
nity morality.
B. Jurisdiction
As with any judicial body, a primary problem in the review of a court-
martial proceeding is the jurisdiction of the court (here a court convened by
military authority) to exercise lawful powers in respect to the accused and to
the offense of which he stands charged. Congress for many years has placed a
stamp of "finality" upon court-martial proceedings executed in all respects in
accordance with provisions of the former Articles of War and today's revised
articles of the UCMJ."' The statutory machinery therefore insulates legally
sufficient proceedings from needless litigation. Nevertheless, federal courts will
permit collateral inquiry into court-martial proceedings for the general purpose
of testing questions of "jurisdiction," 2' normally by way of habeas corpus and
not by appeal'24 but usually (though more recently not necessarily) after the
petitioner has exhausted pertinent remedies within the court-martial system. 2'
Such questions customarily involve validity of the court-martial itself, as well
as its powers over the person, the offense, or the sentence, and are most likely
to be closely examined for adherence by the military to prescribed conditions.
The exercise of judicial review thus brings the military criminal law system
within the traditional concept of civilian control and at the same time contem-
plates a reasonable accommodation of the military system within the judiciary,
so that constitutional issues can be aired to permit full and fair consideration 2"
of the accused's claims. Through this facility of the law, the Supreme Court
has, from time to time, restricted military authority assumed under the congres-
sional grant. That the imposition of these restrictions normally results in bold
headline news tends to attest to the relatively low ratio that judicial intrusions
bear to the general incidence of court-martial proceedings.
1. Of the court-martial
As has been seen, courts-martial derive their authority from the constitu-
tional power of the Congress to govern the armed forces. They are recognized
also in the exception relating to "cases arising in the land and naval forces"
provided by fifth amendment grand jury requirements and are an essential
attribute of command. The jurisdiction of courts-martial extends only to penal
matters (not, e.g., to payment of damages or to collection of private debts) and
322 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970), and its predecessor provisions.
323 E.g., Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
324 Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879), See Weckstein, Federal Court Review of Courts-
Martial Proceedings: A Delicate Balance of Individual Rights and Military Responsibilities,
54 MmirrmY L. REv. 1, 9 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Weckstein, Federal Court Review].
325 For a discussion of exhaustion of remedies, see Weckstein, Federal Court Review, at
54-74. Recently the Supreme Court denied the Army's right to dispose of military charges
against a soldier whose habeas corpus petition challenged the Army's refusal to release him as
a conscientious objector (subsequent to which he was charged with refusal 'to obey an order
to enplane for Vietnam), since the subject matter of his petition was independent of the
military criminal proceedings. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972). Cf., Gusik v. Schilder,
340 U.S. 128 (1950); Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969).
326 See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953).
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normally it does not depend on the location of the offense. Moreover, its juris-
diction applies only when charges are properly referred to the court by its con-
vening authority. An individual cannot invoke court-martial jurisdiction by
his demand to be tried (except in lieu of proposed nonjudicial punishment, pur-
suant to article 15, UCMJ).
Whether a court-martial is duly constituted will depend essentially on
whether it was convened by a lawfully competent official and whether member-
ship of the court-martial consists of persons in number and competency as
required by law. For its judgments to be valid, the court-martial also must be
shown to have jurisdiction over the person accused and the offense charged."
The provision in the Military Justice Act of 1968 allowing an accused to
elect to be tried by a military judge alone at a general or special court-martial
requires the accused's request to be "in writing." 8" That requirement cannot be
legally met, according to the Court of Military Appeals, by an accused's oral
request at the trial subsequent to the judge's explanation of the accused's right
to request that mode of procedure, even where the judge during the colloquy
invited the accused to make known his choice." Nor is the requirement met
where the written request was alleged to be "lost" and a written request dated
prior to the commencement of the trial was later submitted and attached to the
record.33 °
2. Of the person
Artide 2.s defines twelve classes of persons subject to the Code, principally
conditions fulfilled by military personnel on active duty. However, jurisdiction
also is extended to include cadets and midshipmen, members of reserve and
retired components under specified conditions, prisoners under court-martial
sentence, prisoners of war, personnel of certain other agencies serving with the
armed forces and, in time of war, others accompanying an armed force in the
field.
In a series of related cases, the Supreme Court ruled that court-martial
jurisdiction under the UCMJ does not apply to the following:
a. Persons lawfully separated from the military service, even if the of-
fense charged was committed while the offender was on active
duty. 32
327 MCM, 1969 (Rev.), supra note 5, para. 8. Courts-martial also are limited in their
power to impose specific punishments, according to their classification, i.e., summary, special,
and general. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-20, 856 (1970) (UCMJ arts. 18, 19, 20, and 56);
MCM, 1969 '(Rev.), supra note 5, ch. XXV (esp. the Table of Maximum Punishments,
para. 127c).
328 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1970).
329 United States v. Dean, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 212, 43 C.M.R. 52 (1970).
330 United States v. Mazzurco, 43 C.M.R. 762 (A.C.M.R. 1971). See United States
v. Nix, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 76, 44 C.M.R. 130 (1971) (holding jurisdictional error without prej-
udice where written request for trial by judge followed testimony of one witness).
331 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1970).
332 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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b. Civilian dependents of military personnel who accompany their spon-
sors on peacetime oversea tours.333
In dealing with the issue of civilian dependents, the Court concluded that
the test for jurisdiction of the person is one of status, i.e., whether the accused
is a person who can be regarded as falling within the term "land and naval
Forces.3 8 4
3. Of the offense
The jurisdictional test of status subsequently was significantly expanded
in O'Callahan v. Parker3 5 to require, in addition, that the offense must be "ser-
vice connected." Under that test, the Court denied authority of a court-martial
to try a soldier for attempted rape, housebreaking, and assault with attempt
to rape. The soldier, in civilian attire while on pass from his post in Hawaii,
had broken into a Honolulu hotel room, assaulted a girl, and attempted to rape
her. The Court's decision left for later cases to fill in the interstices of the service
connection test and also to determine whether the newly formulated rule should
be applied retrospectively.
The off-post no-military connection rationale quickly produced reversals
by the Court of Military Appeals of court-martial conviction in two cases of
serious crimes committed by military personnel, one involving female victims not
associated with the military,"' and the second involving civilian owned property
and civilian victims, committed in civilian communities.3 In another case,
court-martial jurisdiction was affirmed for the offense of sodomy committed in
government quarters within the confines of a naval base but was denied as to
offenses with the same individual which transpired off post. 38
Within a month of O'Callahan, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia construed "the spirit of O'Callahan" to preclude ex-
pansive application of article 2(10) (making subject to UGMJ in time of war,
persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field) and thus
denied court-martial power over a civilian merchant seaman charged by the
military with premeditated murder in a bar in Da Nang, Vietnam, while his
333 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (involving a capital offense); Kinsella v. United
States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (a noncapital offense); accord, McElroy v. Guag-
liardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (civilian employees).
See generally F. WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE (1967).
334 Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1960).
335 395 U.S. 258 (1969). This case had perhaps the heaviest impact on military criminaljurisdiction by eliminating from its reach nonservice connected offenses even though com-
mitted by military personnel, provided they are cognizable in a civilian court and were com-
mitted while off duty, off post, and out of uniform. See Rice, O'Callahan v. Parker: Court-
Martial Jurisdiction, "Service Connection," Confusion, and the Serviceman, 51 MILITARY
L. REV. 41 (1971).
336 United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 259 (1969) (a case strikingly
similar to O'Callahan). The reversal in this case was reported to be worth $50,000 in back
pay. TnE NATIONAL OBSERVER, Sept. 22, 1969, at 2.
337 United States v. Prather, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 560, 40 C.M.R. 272 (1969) (wrongful
appropriation of an automobile, robbing a gasoline station, and resisting arrest).
338 United States v. Shockley, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 610, 40 C.M.R. 322 (1969).
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ship was in the harbor off-loading fuel for use by the armed forces." 9 And,
jurisdiction was denied for court-martial of off-base possession (not use) of
marijuana "within the peripheries of the civilian United States."' ' s ' Military
jurisdiction was affirmed in two federal circuits where a substantial portion of
the offense occurred on post, though related transactions took place in the
civilian community, 4' and off post where offenses were of broad and strong
military connotation and had lasting and pervasive effect. 42 Offenses in foreign
countries were held to be subject to military jurisdiction by reference to O'Cal-
lahan in several instances.
Because the use of marijuana and narcotics by military persons on or off
a military base has special military significance,343 the Court of Military Appeals
upheld military jurisdiction over specifications alleging such offenses but it
would not extend that rationale to include jurisdiction over importation and
transportation of marijuana absent proof of circumstances relating the alleged




The Court of Military Appeals successively established certain other posi-
tive factors to supply requisite nexus between offense and military service. Those
factors include offenses committed (1) on a military reservation,345 (2) petty
in nature (since no constitutional requirement for indictment or jury trial is
involved),'" (3) involving a serviceman as victim,3  (4) even if the accused
was not aware of the victim's military identity,"' and (5) where the accused
uses his military status to perpetrate a crime.~"
Not surprisingly, O'Callahan inspired much professional comment, as ob-
served by the Supreme Court when it considered Relford v. Commandant,"r'
after granting certiorari "limited to the retroactivity and scope of O'Calla-
han .. ."35 Relford, a soldier at Fort Dix (whose court-martial conviction had
become "final" more than five years prior to O'Callahan) was convicted of
raping and kidnapping two women on a military post-one, the daughter of a
soldier; the second, the wife of an airman who was driving from her home on
339 The "seaman in port for a short period, living on his ship and under the discipline
of his civilian captain while waiting for it to turn around [was] not assimilated to any military
personnel in terms of living quarters or conditions. . . ." Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 821,
823 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (reversing a district court's dismissal of Latney's petition for habeas
corpus and ordering his release).
340 Moylan v. Laird, 305 F. Supp. 551, 557 (D.C. R.I. 1969).
341 Diorio v. McBride, 431 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1970); Zenor v. Vogt, 434 F.2d 189
(5th Cir. 1970); King v. Moseley, 430 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1970).
342 Silvero v. Chief of Naval Air Basic Training, 428 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1970) (sodomy
by an officer upon enlisted personnel).
343 Gallagher v. United States, 423 F.2d 1371 (Ct. C1. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849
(1970); Bell v. Clark, 437 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971); Williamson v. Alldridge, 320 F. Supp.
840 (W.D. Okla. 1970); See also United States v. Easter, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 68, 41 C.M.R.
68 (1969); United States v. Stevenson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 69, 41 C.M.R. 69 (1969); and
United States v. Gill, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 93, 41 C.M.R. 93 (1969).
344 United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969).
345 E.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 40 C.M.R. 321 (1969).
346 United States v. Sharkey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969).
347 United States v. Rego, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 9, 41 C.M.R. 9 (1969).
348 United States v. Camacho, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 11, 41 C.M.R. 11 (969).
349 United States v. Morisseau, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 17, 41 C.M.R. 17 (1969). The mere wearing
of a uniform, however, would not necessarily confer the requisite jurisdiction. United States
v. Armes, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 15, 41 C.M.R. 15 (1969).
350 401 U.S. 355, 356 (1971). See Recent Developments, 52 MILITARY L. REV. 169 (1971).
351 Relford v. Commandant, 397 U.S. 934 (1970).
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base to the post exchange, where she worked as a waitress. Noting its ad hoc
consideration of the circumstances in O'Callahan," the Court identified a num-
ber of factors which distinguished Relford's case from O'Callahan,353 particularly
stressing military interest in the security of persons and of property on the mili-
tary enclave, as well as the military commander's authority and responsibility
to maintain order in his command,'" and the adverse effects a crime on a mili-
tary base has upon the post, its personnel, and its mission and operations.
For these and other specified reasons, 5 ' a unanimous Court held that a
serviceman's crime against the person of an individual upon the base or against
property on the base is "service connected" within the meaning of O'Callahan
and that, therefore, Relford's offenses were subject to court-martial jurisdiction.
Since court-martial jurisdiction was found to apply, the Court declined to con-
sider the question of O'Callahan's retrospectivity, leaving that issue for resolu-
tion in litigation where it would be solely dispositive.5 6
The surge of cases purporting to construe perceptible limits of the rule of
service connections" seems to be dwindling, though the issue continues to be
litigated. Arguments grounded on the O'Callahan premise have not defeated
court-martial jurisdiction where the offenses were committed partially on and
partially off a military base,358 or in places outside the United States where they
could not be prosecuted in a federal court.359 But, the sale of marijuana and
LSD off base in a civilian community to a civilian is not triable by a court-
martial.36 Lastly, opportunity for the Supreme Court to confront the issue of
O'Callahan's possible retrospective application has been provided by a split
among the circuits.5 8'
352 The offense was there committed by a serviceman (1) on pass and (2) off post (3)
in a place not under military control (4) within U.S. territorial limits '(5) in peacetime under
circumstances unrelated to war powers (6) with no connection between the accused's mili-
tary duties and the crime, (7) the victim not engaged in duty relating to the military, (8)
with a civilian court available for prosecution, (9) in the absence of any flouting of military
authority, (10) threat to a military post, or (11) violation of military property and, signifi-
cantly, (12) it was in the nature of offenses traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts. 401
U.S. at 365-66.
353 The offenses were committed on a military enclave and the security of the victims,
both properly on the post, was threatened and their persons violated, and in both cases
their cars were forcefully and unlawfully entered. 401 U.S. at 366.
354 The Court here referred to Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961)
(cited note 50 supra). 401 U.S. at 367.
355 Inter alia, that O'Callahan should not be interpreted as confining court-martial juris-
diction to the "purely military offenses that have no counterpart in nonmilitary criminal
law." 401 U.S. at 368-69.
356 401 U.S. at 370.
357 See, e.g., Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 358n.7-8 (1971).
358 Harkcom v. Parker, 439 F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 1971) (attempted rape began on military
reservation and continued off base); Swisher v. Moseley, 442 F.2d 1331 (10th Cir. 1971)
(interstate transportation of vehicle stolen on post, where state line crossing occurred off
post); United States v. Bonavita, No. 24,537, (C.M.A. May 19, 1972) digested in 72-7
JunoE ADVOcATE LEGAL SERVICE 5 (concealment by an accused on post of a car stolen from
a civilian off post).
359 Swift v. Commandant, 440 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1971). United States ex rel. Jacobs
v. Froehlke, 334 F. Supp. 1107 (D.C. 1971).
360 United States v. Morley, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 179, 43 C.M.R. 19 (1970). Cf., United States
v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969).
361 Gosa v. Mayden, 450 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 407 U.S. 920 (1972);
Schlomann v. Moseley, 457 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1972); Harkcom v. Parker, 341 F. Supp.
751 (M.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 1971); Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
264, 41 C.M.R. 264 (1970) (against retroactive application). United States ex rel. Flemings
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4. As to the sentence
A general court may impose any punishment authorized by the Code, sub-
ject to limitations imposed by the President. A special court may impose no more
than six months' confinement at hard labor, certain forfeitures of pay and, under
limited circumstances, a bad conduct discharge. A summary court-martial
(which is authorized to try only enlisted personnel) may not adjudge punish-
ment greater than confinement for a month and certain restrictions and for-
feitures of pay.16
2
A special limitation was recently required by the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement in Argersinger v. Hamlin,' prohibiting any sentence to imprison-
ment for a defendant not represented by counsel. Pursuant to that decision, the
Army Judge Advocate General issued instructions forbidding a sentence to con-
finement for any offense if the accused was not represented by a lawyer, together
with necessary guidance to effect appropriate corrective action in the case of
all confinements not conforming to the Argersinger rule adjudged by a court-
martial subsequent to the Supreme Court's ruling.
C. Anatomy of Military Justice
Examination of the military justice structure will perforce be circumscribed
by the limited dimensions of this paper but a few selected aspects are considered
to suggest the basic framework within which military commanders determine
appropriate disposition of those relatively few members of the military establish-
ment whose wayward acts may require application of measures authorized by
the UCMJ.6 4
1. Pretrial Restraint
The UCMJ furnishes a commander various policy options when he is con-
fronted with a disciplinary problem.' At the outset, if he contemplates pro-
v. Chafee, 330 F. Supp. 193 '(E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd 458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1972) cert. granted,
sub nom., Warner v. Flemings, 407 U.S. 919 (1972) (for retroactive application of O'Callahan).
Under Mercer the service connection rule is not extended by the military to cases con-
cluded before promulgation of the O'Callahan opinion, on June 2, 1969. Enzor v. United
States, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 257, 43 C.M.R. 97 (1971). In Enzor, it was determined that where
an accused's conviction was affirmed by a military board of review prior to O'Callahan and
there had been no attempt to appeal, the fact that the time within which the accused could
have appealed did not expire until after O'Callahan did not entitle him to relief under
Mercer's rule (since conviction became final on affirmance in absence of appeal). Note also
that the Supreme Court denied certiorari on the question whether O'Callahan applied to claim
for back pay by a soldier given a dishonorable discharge after his 1955 court-martial, Allen
v. United States, 194 Ct. C1. 1035, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). And as to O'Callahan
and other recent jurisdictional matters, see Comment, The Court of Military Appeals: a Sur-
vey of Recent Decisions, 55 MILITARY L. RaY. 187, 188-190 '(1972).
362 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-820 (1970).
363 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
364 Despite publicity and complaints lodged against military justice, an overwhelming
majority of personnel complete their service-obligated or voluntary, enlisted or commis-
sioned-with no semblance of a criminal charge made against them. See note 26 supra.
365 Presumably, previous consideration will have been given a wide assortment of adminis-
trative actions usually available to him before resort to the UCMJ, including change of duties,
transfer to another unit or (with appropriate concurrences) command warnings or reprimands,
withholding of privileges, to mention but some nonpunitive type measures.
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ceeding under UCMJ, normally he will have to determine whether physical re-
straint is required and, if so, in what degree (i.e., withdrawal of pass and leave
privileges, restriction to specified areas, arrest, or confinement), pending final
disposition of the initial report of alleged misconduct. In the military, arrest is
a moral restraint limiting personal liberty pending disposition of the indicated
offense, distinguishable from arrest in quarters as punishment, as well as from the
act of apprehension when a person is taken into custody, or from restriction to
specified areas, a less severe form of pretrial restraint."'
No restraint is required by law. Thus the determination to impose restraint
vel non involves analysis of the pertinent circumstances--including potential
consequences of inappropriate restraint-in relation to the incident under con-
sideration. Confinement can be justified only when it is necessary to insure the
accused's presence at the trial, if the alleged offense is serious (murder, rape,
robbery, etc.), or if there exists a reasonable possibility that violence may be com-
mitted by or against the accused." 7 During prolonged investigation, the nature
of any restraint imposed should be reexamined at appropriate intervals with a
view toward termination or modification, since restraint of any kind must be
justified if lack of speedy trial is alleged by the accused. Many commands have
instituted a procedure under which a seasoned judge advocate visits major con-
finement facilities in the status of a "magistrate" to assist the commander in de-
termining whether continued confinement is warranted. The program was com-
mended by the Court of Military Appeals as a device to reduce occasions for the
contention that an accused has been denied opportunity to consult with counsel. 8
Pretrial restraints, especially confinement, ultimately may be considered in
connection with sentencing in the event of conviction, and allowances therefor
usually are made. Even more significant, the nature of pretrial confinement may
constitute "prior punishment" in violation of article 13."'
Regardless of pretrial limitations imposed, the accused is entitled to prompt
and specific information concerning the nature of charges against him,7 " since
it is unlawful to delay trial unreasonably." 1 Practically, each day of delay adds
to the merit of an accused's m6tion to dismiss charges for lack of speedy trial.372
2. Nonjudicial Punishment
Least stringent of the UCMJ instrumentalities for punishment is the article
15 procedure for nonjudicial punishment.7 Such punishment may be imposed
only by a commander recognized by his superiors as chiefly responsible for dis-
366 MCM, 1969 (Rev.), supra note 300, para. 18-21. For a closer look at pretrial restraint
implications, see Boiler, Pre-trial Restraint in the Military, 50 MILrrARY L. REv. 71 (1970).
367 SOLO, supra note 1, Criminal Law, pt. B, at 19.
368 United States v. Bielecki, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 450, 45 C.M.R. 224 (1972); see The Mii-
tary Magistrate Program, 2 TH. ARMY LAWYER May, 1972, at 3.
369 United States v. Bayhand, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 762, 21 C.M.R. 84 (1956) (performance
of functions similar to those required of sentenced prisoners); ef., United States v. Nelson,
18 U.S.C.M.A. 177, 39 C.M.R. 177 (1969).
370 10 U.S.C. §§ 810, 811, 833 (1970) (UCMJ arts. 10, 11, 33).
371 10 U.S.C. § 898 (1970) (UCMJ art. 98).
372 United States v. Burton, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971) (pretrial con-
finement for over three months raises rebuttable presumption of denial of speedy trial).
373 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970).
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cipline in a particular unit (i.e., the company commander, not the platoon com-
mander or a company executive or other staff assistant). The offense must be
cognizable under the UCMJ, since the accused may reject article 15 punishment
and demand trial by court-martial, and it must be of a minor nature (ordinarily
not such an offense which, if tried by general court-martial, could be punished by
dishonorable discharge or confinement at hard labor for more than a year).
Normally, article 15 punishment will bar subsequent trial for the same offense.
If a competent authority determines that the offense was not minor, the accused
may be tried by court-martial for the same offense. The accused is entitled to
consult with a judge advocate concerning the proposed disciplinary action and
may submit any matters which he may have in defense, or in extenuation and
mitigation.
The extent of punishment imposable under article 15 is related to the status
of the accused (i.e., whether an enlisted man, and, if enlisted, his grade), as well
as to the commander (i.e., whether a general officer or commander exercising
general court-martial jurisdiction, field grade, or company grade officer). For
example, a company grade commander may not effect forfeiture of pay of an
officer at all, and only 7 days' pay in the case of enlisted personnel. A general
officer may restrict a subordinate officer for 60 days and forfeit half of one month
of the latter's pay for two months; similar authority is given a field grade officer
over enlisted men.
Punishment imposed is appealable through the proper organizational chan-
nel to the next superior commander by an accused who believes his punishment
"unjust or disproportionate to the offense."
3. Summary Court-Martial
If the accused is an enlisted person, his case may be referred to a summary
court-martial, composed of one commissioned officer, normally convened by a
battalion commander for noncapital offenses. 7 4 Because of its limited punish-
ment power, the summary court is intended to hear cases involving relatively
minor offenses. The accused is not entitled to representation by detailed military
counsel, though he may retain civilian counsel at his own expense, and he may
not be tried by a summary court if he objects. The hearing is conducted in a
relatively informal procedure,-75 an abbreviated record of which is forwarded to
the convening authority and subsequently to the SJA at the supervisory general
court-martial jurisdiction (usually at division level) for review."'
4. Special Court-Martial
The middle forum in the court-martial system is the special court-martial,
374 The reference to noncapital cases (and, anywhere else herein relating to the military
code's prescription for a death penalty) may have become academic in view of the strictures
against capital punishment pronounced in Furman v. George, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
375 MOM, 1969, (Rev.), supra note 5, para. 79d.
376 10 U.S.C. § 865 (1970) (UCMJ art. 65); MOM, 1969 (Rev.), supra note 300,
paras. 79e, 85b.
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consisting of at least three members. In addition, a military judge normally will
be assigned to the court to serve as presiding officer and to rule on questions of
law." 7 However, the accused may elect to be tried by the military judge alone,
or he may choose trial by a panel including enlisted personnel (in which case at
least a third of the membership of the court must be enlisted). Trial and defense
counsel are detailed for each special court-martial. Although the trial counsel
need not be a lawyer, the accused is entitled to representation by a lawyer."' A
"Bad Conduct Discharge" (BCD) special court-martial differs from the standard
special court in that it has the power to award a BCD. Certain formalities must
be met before that power can be exercised: Both a military judge and qualified
defense counsel must be detailed, a verbatim record is kept, and the court-martial
must be convened by a commander exercising general court-martial jurisdiction." 9
A convening authority who does not exercise general court-martial juris-
diction must forward the record of proceedings, including the sentence as ap-
proved by him, for review by the officer who has general court-martial jurisdic-
tion over the command.
5. General Court-Martial
The highest trial court in the military system is the general court-martial,
convened only by the President or the secretary concerned and commanders
specified in article 2238. and others designated by the secretaries. Cases are heard
by that court only after the convening authority has had the benefit of formal
pretrial advice submitted by the SJA. The general court-martial consists of a
military judge and at least five court members, typically commissioned officers. As
in the case of the special court-martial, the accused may elect trial before the
military judge alone or he may demand enlisted membership on the court. Trial
and defense counsel (both members of the JAGC) are detailed for each general
court-martial, but the accused is free to choose his own civilian counsel at no
expense to the Government.
A charge may not be referred to a general court-martial for trial until a
thorough and impartial investigation thereof is made to inquire into the truth
of the matters set forth in the charge.3 ' The accused and his counsel are en-
titled to be present during the investigation, and a recommendation by the in-
vestigating officer that the case be disposed of by reference to a general court-
martial for trial must be made in the nature of a formal report to the officer
directing the investigation." 2 The investigation partakes of the nature both of
a preliminary judicial hearing and of the proceedings of a grand jury. By its
377 If a military judge is not available, the senior member present presides, but the
court may not adjudge a bad conduct discharge in the absence of justification by the convening
authority for holding the trial without a military judge and appearance by qualified counsel
in behalf of accused. 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1970) (UCM.T art. 19).
378 Unless such counsel is not available because of military exigencies.
379 10 U.S.C. §§ 816, 819, 823 (1970) (UCMJ arts. 16, 19, 23).
380 10 U.S.C. § 822 (1970).
381 10 U.S.C.§ 832 '(1970) (UCMJ art. 32). The investigation "operates as a discovery
proceeding for the accused and stands as a bulwark against baseless charges." United
States v. Samuels, 10 U.S.O.M.A. 206, 212, 27 C.M.R. 280, 286 (1959).
382 The reconmnendations are advisory, however.
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nature and the manner in which it is conducted, this aspect of military law im-
poses upon the Government "to a degree unmatched in the civilian community,"
the obligation to disclose to the accused prior to trial all matters within its
knowledge which bear significantly upon his guilt or innocence. 8'
The record of trial by a general court-martial is reviewed by the SJA before
action may be taken thereon by the convening authority. Sentences to dishonor-
able or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one year or more, may not be
executed unless affirmed by a Court of Military Review and, in cases reviewed
by it, the Court of Military Appeals. Sentences, to dismissal of an officer, cadet,
or midshipman require, in addition, approval by the secretary or his designee.
Sentences extending to death or involving a general or flag officer may not be
executed until affirmed by a Court of Military Review and the Court of Military
Appeals and approved by the President. 84
6. Disposition Other Than By Trial
An important option open to the commander is reflected by his authority
to approve a discharge in lieu of court-martial ("for the good of the service"),
upon request of an accused whose conduct has made him triable for an offense
which could lead to either a bad conduct or dishonorable discharge.' Use of
this authority is appropriate when administrative burdens of courts-martial and
confinement are not warranted or because of minimal rehabilitative effect
punishment might have (including lack of benefit to the Army or to society), as
in the case of individuals having chronic disciplinary problems or who would
otherwise qualify for administrative discharge by reason of misconduct or un-
fitness if court-martial action were not initiated.
Another obvious option exercisable by the commander is to dismiss the
charges when preliminary investigation discloses that the charges are trivial or un-
founded or, for other appropriate reasons, warrant dismissal.
7. Limitations Upon the Convening Authority
Criticism of the military justice system reflects a curious but understandable
dichotomy of interests. Thus complaints that the commander wields dispro-
portionate control over various judicial aspects of the system3s 6 are countered by
the belief of many commanders that "technical" requirements of military law
frequently impinge on essential command prerogatives.
Since the commander exercises significant independent discretion when
considering options available to him in many phases and aspects of a court-
383 MacDonald v. Hodson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 582, 583, 42 O.M.R. 184, 185 (1970); United
States v. Mohr, No. 24,354 (C.M.A. May 5, 1972); see Basom, Uniform Code of Military
Justice-In Line, Plus, 30 Fed. B.J. 297 (1971).
384 MOM, 1969, (Rev.) supra note 300, para. 98. As to death sentences, see Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
385 See, e.g., Army Reg. 635-200, change 36, ch. 10 (1972); and see consideration of
administrative discharges for misconduct or unfitness in Part I, supra.
386 For analysis of command responsibilities, see Hansen, Judicial Functions for the Com-
mander, 41 MIITARY L. Rnv. 1 (1968).
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martial proceeding,8 " he is vulnerable to allegations of abuse of authority to
effect discipline according to his personal desires. Just as the magnitude of the
discipline problem in the armed forces tends to become exaggerated in outcries
of critics whose indignation frequently stems from a particular case, so do broad
indictments of abusive command control tend to exceed the circumstances
prompting accusations of interference with the court-martial process.
The Code purports to insulate court-martial personnel and administration
from improper command influence to assure a fair trial for an accused. 8 8 A few
instances may serve to illustrate the general standard of neutrality required of
commanders in actions directly affecting the fate of an accused.
Policy instructions purporting to circumscribe prerogatives of court-martial
members are impermissible. Thus a pretrial lecture stressing the deterrent func-
tion of a court-martial respecting command disciplinary problems was prej-
udicial,3 9 as was a posted notice communicating command policy regarding
petty thievery.3 O Similar effect was ascribed to command communications ex-
pressing discontent with court-martial sentences 91 and arguments of trial
counsel.38
2
Similar difficulties have been encountered in the appointment of court-
martial panels. For example, a preponderance of law enforcement personnel
3 3
or a selection practice suggesting possible racial discrimination s 4 was held to
exceed permissible bounds of discretion.
D. Miscellaneous Recent Issues
1. Warnings
In the military, as in the civilian community, interrogation of a suspect is
of critical importance in a criminal investigation. Constitutional due process for
a civilian suspect under the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona 98 contemplates "full
effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination, the mainstay of our ad-
versary system of criminal justice,"' 9 pursuant to the fifth amendment's mandate.
The military guarantee against self-incrimination is contained in article 31,
UCMJ. In fact, long-settled practice in the military against interrogation of a
suspect without adequate warning (i.e., the right not to make a statement and
that any statement might be used against the suspect in a criminal proceeding)
387 Among others, he appoints and convenes the court-martial, refers the case to trial,
directs issuance of subpoenas, authorizes search, and acts on findings and sentence.
388 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1970) (UCMJ art. 37).
389 United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 110, 113, 37 C.M.R. 374, 377 (1967).
390 United States v. Cole, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 296, 298, 38 C.M.R. 94, 96 (1967).
391 United States v. Kitchens, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 593, 31 C.M.R. 175, 179 (1961).
392 United States v. Ward, 35 C.M.R. 834, 839 (A.B.R. 1965).
393 United States v. Hedges, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 642, 645, 29 C.M.R. 458, 461 (1960).
394 United States v. Greene, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 232, 238, 43 C.M.R. 72, 78 (1970). Though
there are other isolated examples of judicial rebuke, see, e.g., cases noted in Symposium, Beyond
the Military Justice Act of 1968: Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, supra note 298, at 285, the furor over command influence, much like that of the sys-
tem in general, suggests the improbable image of an inverted iceberg, where the mass (abuse
potential) would appear above the waters, while the tip (confirmed cases of prejudicial com-
mand influence) would be barely perceptible.
395 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
396 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966).
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and the right to consult counsel during interrogation was cited by the Supreme
Court in enunciating the Miranda rule. 9 The article is reinforced by an ex-
clusionary rule and military practice forbidding admission of evidence incon-
sistent with article 31 and Miranda.9 The military has received emphatic
guidance from the department level to give warnings, even if there be doubt that
the facts may require article 31 advice, especially under circumstances requiring
some volition of action on the part of a suspect rather than mere passive resistance
to observation. 99
Although there may be circumstances when all the aspects of the Miranda
doctrine may not be applicable (e.g., when the suspect is not under substantial
restraint of personal liberty), nevertheless, Army policy has decreed that Miranda
warnings will be applied whenever the broader article 31 caution is required."'
The terms of article 31 applicable to a "person suspected of an offense" have
been interpreted so as to make it clear that if the investigator is in possession of
information permitting a "reasonable" inference that the individual concerned
had committed an affense, the latter is entitled to the article 31-Miranda notice."
Patently, the problem will require ad hoc determinations in the light of specific
facts and circumstances.
Though the warning is not prerequisite to a valid search, it is clear that
admissibility of any statement made during the search will depend upon adequate
admonition under article 31." The warning is likewise required where sur-
render of stolen items is intended to be directed by the investigator.4"'
On the other hand, the warning need not precede questioning merely for
purposes of identification (without any basis for suspicion that an offense was
committed by the subject of the interrogation)." ° Nor need a doctor give a
warning prior to questioning an individual for diagnostic and treatment pur-
poses." 5 The self-incrimination privilege therefore would not normally bar testi-
mony of a psychiatrist as to the accused's sanity."° The warning requirement
is not applicable to wholly voluntary statements made by someone clearly not
suspected of an offense,"0 or by one knowledgeable of his rights even in the face
of an allegedly defective warning.0 8 And, after adequate warning by an in-
vestigator concerning the accused's right to counsel at an interview, following
which the accused knowingly consented to proceed without his counsel, an ac-
397 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 489 (1966).
398 M.G.M, 1969 '(Rev.), supra note 300, para. 140a(2). United States v. Kaiser, 19
U.S.O.M.A. 104, 41 C.M.R. 104 (1969); United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37
C.M.R. 249 (1967); see Hansen, Miranda and the Military Development of a Constitutional
Right, 42 MILITARY L. REv. 55 (1968).
399 SOLO, supra note 1, at 74.
400 67-9 JuDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICE 6.
401 United States v. Anglin, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 520, 40 C.M.R. 232 (1969).
402 United States v. Schultz, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 311, 315, 41 C.M.R. 311, 315 (1970).
403 United States v. Borodzik, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 95, 44 O.M.R. 149 (1971).
404 United States v. Ballard, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 37 C.M.R. 360 (1967).
405 United States v. Fisher, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 223, 44 G.M.R. 277 (1972).
406 United States v. Babbidge, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 327, 40 C.M.R. 39 (1969); cf. United
States v. White, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 338, 41 C.M.R. 338 (1970) (specific statements of accused
during psychiatric examination may not be referred to at trial to contradict accused's trial
statement, in the absence of proper warning).
407 United States v. Henry, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 98, 44 C.M.R. 152 (1972).
408 United States v. Sikorsky, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 345, 45 C.M.R. 119 (1972).
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cused cannot later be heard to complain about the admission of his pretrial state-




In a somewhat different context, the same result was reached, notwithstand-
ing circumstances which precluded the accused from knowing that a counsel had
been appointed to represent him in subsequent deposition proceedings. Though
accused argued that had he known of the designation of counsel, even for limited
representation, he would not have consented to an interrogation and would not
have waived the right to consult his counsel, it was concluded that an effective
waiver had been made by the accused, permitting consideration of his pretrial
statement.""
In still another variation, pretrial confinement (or its equivalent) alone is
not necessarily a critical stage of the accusatory process (Miranda) so as to
entitle an accused to the assistance and advice of counsel. 4" And, whether ques-
tioning amounts to custodial interrogation usually will depend not necessarily on
formal imposition of custody over a suspect but rather whether he has been
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."' 2 Nonetheless, an
individual may be entitled to a warning even in a chance meeting with an inter-
rogator who suspected him of an offense.1" Moreover, the warning must be ap-
plied to all offenses which might reasonably be suspected by the investigator.1
Notwithstanding decision of the United States Supreme Court to permit,
for impeachment purposes, the use of a pretrial statement following deficient
warning, 15 the Court of Military Appeals has continued the Miranda bar under
such circumstances in view of the Manual's prohibition against any adverse use
of an improperly taken statement.1 6 Although the consequences of pretrial
statements subsequently found to have been made in the absence of proper
warning clearly may not be admitted aduersely to the accused, the converse is
not so, and therefore an accused may be heard in his effort to counteract the
earlier statement.411
Supplementary advice to an article 31 warning to the effect, "If we are
wrong in suspecting you, you do not have the right to remain silent," so varied or
qualified the article 31 notice as to make prejudicially unclear the existence of the
right in that case.' As explained in a subsequent case, a suspect's right to remain
silent does not depend upon whether he is innocent or guilty; it depends on
whether he is a suspect."9
409 United States v. Estep, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 201, 41 C.M.R. 201 (1970).
410 United States v. Flack, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 201, 43 C.M.R. 41 (1970).
411 United States v. Bielecki, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 450, 45 C.M.R. 225 (1972).
412 United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 635, 37 C.M.R. 249, 255 (1967)
(citing Miranda).
413 United States v. Harvey, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 39, 44 C.M.R. 93 (1971).
414 United States v. Johnson, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 324, 43 C.M.R. 160, 164 (1971) (warning
referred to alleged desertion but not to acts which investigator claimed he did not know
were illegal).
415 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
416 United States v. Jordan, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 614, 44 C.M.R. 44 (1971).
417 United States v. Hurt, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 206, 210, 41 C.M.R. 206, 210 (1970).
418 United States v. Hundley, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 45 C.M.R. 45 (1972).




2. Search and Seizure
The fourth amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches. It
further provides that warrants shall issue only upon "probable cause, supported
by Oath... and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." The standard of proof applicable to establish probable
cause also is one of reasonableness. 420
The Court of Military Appeals has said that "the reasonableness of the
officer's conduct not the label placed upon it by the officer or the court below...
dictates the result"; thus, "[t]he constitutionality of a particular search depends
'upon the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case.' "I' In
addition, the Manual provides that "'[p]robable cause [to] search exists when
there is reason to believe that . . ." the objects sought "... are located in the
place or on the person to be searched." 22
A search or examination of an individual's person or property to obtain
certain items of criminal goods422 or evidence of a crime in the military must be
distinguished from an "inspection," i.e., an examination of an individual's person
or property to determine the military readiness or fitness of the person, organiza-
tion or equipment examined. In the latter case, the inspector is not looking for
illegal items, and criminal evidence found during the course of a lawful inspec-
tion is admissible against an accused in subsequent proceedings. 24
Notwithstanding the simply stated tests, the law of search and seizure has
been changing, influenced by emerging problems in criminal justice and by an
apparent expanding propensity for intrusive efforts on the part of law enforce-
ment agencies.4 2 1
Fourth amendment rights are enforced in the military by exclusionary rules
of evidence patterned after civilian practice. Thus admission into evidence of
the product of an unlawful search is precluded, under the rule of Mapp,46 as
delineated in the Manual.41
Historically, military search practice was based on the commander's author-
ity over places and persons subject to his military control. One commentator has
suggested that a 1971 Supreme Court decision may affect the traditional con-
cept.42' However, the advent of the military judge has prompted a new practice
under which Army military judges have been authorized to search warrants upon
420 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
421 United States v. Decker, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 397, 399, 37 C.M.R. 17, 19 (1966).
422 MCM, 1969 (Rev.), supra note 300, para. 152.
423 Contraband (e.g., narcotic drugs), instrumentalities of a crime (e.g., weapons), or
fruits of a crime (e.g., stolen articles). Earlier technical distinctions between criminal goods
and "mere evidence" have been eliminated, United States v. Whisenhant, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 117,
121, 37 C.M.R. 381, 385 (1967), in the light of Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
424 United States v. Grace, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 409, 42 C.M.R. 11 (1970).
425 McNeill, Recent Trends in Search and Seizure, 54 MILITARY L. REV. 83 (1971).
426 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
427 MCM, 1969 (Rev.), supra note 300, para. 152; in fact, the military practice preceded
Mapp.
428 McNeill, Recent Trends in Search and Seizure, supra note 425, at 96, referring to
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), in which a state law enforcement official
was disqualified from issuing a warrant in case he was investigating.
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probable cause as to military persons or military property within the judicial
circuit to which the judges are assigned.-" The procedure requires the request
for a warrant to be supported by an affidavit setting forth facts for consideration
by the judge. If application is based on data furnished by an informer, the sup-
porting evidence must establish the credibility of the informer and the reliability
of his information."'0
A 1969 Supreme 'Court decision limiting warrantless searches incident to
arrest to the person and areas within the immediate control of the arresting
officer has been held to apply in the military, but only prospectively. Several
decisions have negatived admissibility of evidence seized in an area removed from
the place of arrest under circumstances not providing a sufficient basis upon
which to assume that the contraband would be found at that place."" Also a
written form purporting to authorize search of both premises and person but
from which the word "person" had been stricken was insufficient to authorize
a search of the accused's person.433 On the other hand, search of an accused and
his locker in his squad bay was found reasonable,' 4 and compliance with a proper
order of a commander to search the accused, relayed down the chain of com-
mand and executed in orderly manner, also was held to be reasonable.4 '3
A search made with the consent of the accused is lawful, if consent is estab-
lished by "clear and convincing evidence," 430 and warrantless searches are judi-
cially recognized if incident to efforts to prevent the removal of criminal goodsY.3 7
3. Pretrial Agreements
Until comparatively recently, plea bargaining by means of a pretrial agree-
ment has been a somewhat less than well-publicized fact of life for the civilian
criminal bar.4 8 In the military, however, the practice has been a relatively well-
recognized practical method for achieving prompt justice, at least since special
procedures were instituted about fifteen years ago4 9 In fact, pretrial agreements
had been employed in military trials since 1953, though not without some "reser-
vations" by the Court of Military Appeals.440
429 Army Reg. 27-10, change 8 (1971). The authority of military judges to issue war-
rants is in addition to the authority of commanders to authorize searches.
430 United States v. Lidle, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 455, 45 C.M.R. 229 (1972); United States v.
Sparks, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 134, 44 C.M.R. 188 (1971); United States v. McFarland, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 356, 41 C.M.R. 356 (1970).
431 United States v. Bunch, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 309, 41 C.M.R. 309 (1970).
432 E.g., United States v. Elwood, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 376, 41 C.M.R. 376 (1970); United
States v. Moore, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 586, 42 C.M.R. 188 (1970); United States v. Racz, 21
U.S.C.M.A. 24, 44 C.M.R. 78 (1971).
433 United States v. Fleener, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 174, 44 C.M.R. 228 (1972).
434 United States v. Jeter, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 208, 44 C.M.R. 262 (1972).
435 United States v. Miller, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 92, 44 C.M.R. 146 (1971).
436 United States v. Rushing, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 38 C.M.R. 96 (1969).
437 United States v. Soto, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 583, 37 C.M.R. 203 (1967).
438 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970).
439 Based upon JAGA 1957/3748, disseminated by DA message 525595, 8 May 1957, to
SJAs, setting forth conditions governing acceptance by the convening authority of offers to
plead guilty for a consideration. For a Navy viewpoint, see Della Maria, Negotiating and
Drafting the Pretrial Agreement, 25 JAGJ. 117 (1971).
440 United States v. Cummings, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 376, 377, 38 C.M.R. 174, 175 (1968); see
United States v. Walker, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 647, 25 Q.M.R. 151 (1958); United States v. Allen,
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Under the usual practice in the armed services, an offer to plead guilty for a
consideration must be made in the form of a written proposal, initiated at the
instance of the accused, for approval by the convening authority. Essentially,
the accused agrees to plead guilty in return for approval by the convening author-
ity of a stated maximum sentence.44' The prime effect of the agreement is to
change the legal maximum sentence from that prescribed in the Manual to the
terms provided in the agreement," 2 though the agreement does not preclude the
court-martial from imposing the maximum sentence provided by law,4" subject
to corrective action by the convening authority consistent with the terms of the
agreement. Just what the agreement provides for in this respect may be disputed
by the parties."4 This, in turn, may precipitate issues concerning providency of
the plea under the Care doctrine445 in the event the provisions are not free from
ambiguity.
Whether the convening authority remains bound to the agreement in the
event of misconduct by the accused occurring after the bargain has been nego-
tiated usually will depend upon provision made for terminating the agreement
in the event of such contingency.44
Efforts to require the accused to include waivers of rights assertable on
review (such as lack of speedy trial or denial of due process) despite the plea of
guilty may invalidate the purported agreement.447 Moreover, an unwritten
"understanding" by the defense counsel not to raise such an issue (e.g., former
jeopardy) in return for a recommendation to the SJA that a proffered pretrial
agreement be accepted is contrary to public policy, where the accused was un-
aware of the promise." 8
Examination by a military judge of the contents of a pretrial agreement
(to establish providency of accused's plea) is not prejudicial to the accused.449
A lapse of 76 days following imposition of the sentence did not nullify a
conviction where the convening authority's action (though delayed) was con-
sistent with the pretrial provisions.4 5
4. Speedy Trial
The military standard for speedy trial, as exemplified by article 10, UGMJ,
and implementing Manual provisions,45 is more rigorous than the sixth amend-
8 U.S.C.M.A. 504, 25 C.M.R. 8 (1957); United States v. Mogardo, 41 C.M.R. 490 (A.B.R.
1969).
441 United States v. Brady, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 614, 38 C.M.R. 412 (1968).
442 United States v. Brice, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 336, 339, 38 C.M.R. 134, 137 (1967).
443 United States v. Sanchez, 40 C.M.R. 698, 699-700 (A.B.R. 1969).
444 United States v. Veteto, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 39 C.M.R. 64 (1968); United States v.
Clark, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 37 C.M.R. 290 (1967).
445 United States v. Care, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 535, 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969).
446 See, United States v. Conway, 43 C.M.R. 512 (A.C.M.R. 1970).
447 United States v. Cummings, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 376, 38 C.M.R. 174 (1968).
448 United States v. Troglin, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 44 C.M.R. 237 (1972).
449 United States v. Villa, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 42 C.M.R. 166 (1970).
450 United States v. Moore, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 274, 277, 41 C.M.R. 274, 277 (1970).
451 Under article 10, any person arrested or confined is entitled to "immediate steps" to
inform him of the specific wrong of which he is accused and to try him or to dismiss the
charges and release him; MCM, 1969 (Rev.), supra note 300, paras. 68i, 215e.
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ment's requirement that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial in all
criminal prosecutions.452
Recently, the Court of Military Appeals determined that, in the absence of
a request for continuance by the accused, there is a presumption that accused
has been denied his right to a speedy trial when his pretrial confinement exceeds
three months.45 The right to a speedy trial is enforced through provision for a
motion by the accused to dismiss charges based on evidence showing a denial
of the right,4" which imposes upon the prosecution the burden of establishing
that the delay was not unreasonable.45
The right to a speedy trial was early determined to be a personal right
which could be waived by failure to assert it at the trial."' After a series of
supplemental decisions,4 it became apparent that circumstances could tie a
speedy trial issue to claims of denial of due process and that waiver by inaction
might not apply to closely related issues alleging lack of speedy trial and denial
of due process."5 '
The mere passage of time does not necessarily equate with a denial of the
constitutional privilege of timely trial. For example, an accused cannot claim
as unreasonable delay a period which he exploited to his advantage as a de-
fendant in a civilian court prosecution.45 On the other hand, a speedy trial
contention based on failure of notice of charges while an accused was confined
was held to be proper, notwithstanding the accused understood the reasons for
confinement as determined pursuant to questioning by the military judge.4 0
Where the Government has made credible explanation, the speedy trial
contention was not favored. 48 ' Conversely, when the record reflected total in-
activity on the part of the Government for 47 days after the accused's confinement
and, during the next 10 days, the Government merely had moved the accused
from a civilian jail to a military confinement facility and where no reasons were
given for the Government's inaction, the accused was denied his right to a speedy
trial.462
The problem of speedy trial usually is addressed to transactions concluding
with the commencement of actual trial. However, the Court of Military Ap-
452 United States v. Burton, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 117, 44 C.M.R. 166, 171 (1971). See
also Tichenor, The Accused's Right To a Speedy Trial in Military Law, 52 MILITARY L. Ruv.
1, 46 (1971).
453 United States v. Burton, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 117, 44 C.M.R. 166, 171 (1971); cf.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), where in a civilian context the Supreme Court rejected
a rigid fixed time formula, favoring an ad hoe balance weighing the conduct of the prosecu-
tion and the defendant.
454 Para. 68i, supra. MCM, 1969 (Rev.), supra note 5, para. 68i.
455 United States v. Mohr, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 360, 45 C.M.R. 134 (1972).
456 United States v. Hounshell, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 6, 21 C.M.R. 129, 132 (1956).
457 See Tichenor, The Accused's Right to a Speedy Trial in Military Law, 52 MILITARY
L. REv. 1, 40-46 (1971).
458 United States v. Schalck, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 371, 34 C.M.R. 151 (1964); see Tichenor,
supra note 457, at 42-43.
459 United States v. Pierce, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 225, 226-27, 41 C.M.R. 225, 226-7 (1970).
460 United States v. Turnipseed, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 137, 42 C.M.R. 329 (1970). "The appel-
lant is under no obligation to aid the Government in obtaining his conviction." Id. at 138-39,
42 C.M.R. at 330-31.
461 United States v. Matin, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 432, 43 C.M.R. 272 (1971); United States v.
Ray, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 331, 43 C.M.R. 171 (1971).
462 United States v. Hubbard, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 131, 44 C.M.R. 185 (1971).
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peals has expressed concern also with expediting review of the court-martial
record at every stage of the appellate process. In an annual report, 4 3 the court
called attention to the increase in time required to dispose of cases at the ap-
pellate review level. Several cases trace tentative judicial ventures into this area.
In one instance, the Government attempted to account for alleged delay in review
of the case by reference to inadvertent misrouting of the record. Though the
issue was not dispositive of the case, the Court of Military Appeals observed,
"When the Government has control of the procedures required to effect timely
disposition of criminal charges, neither its good faith nor 'inadvertent' negligence
can excuse inordinate delay.""' Delay between findings and appellate review,
in the absence of demonstrated prejudice (e.g., where accused failed to identify
errors redressable by prompt review), presented "no wrong to be righted."" 5
Though denial of counsel during pretrial confinement in itself may not
amount to a violation of Miranda rights, an accused's frustrated effort to obtain
legal help in such circumstances may cause a court to characterize trial delay,
if any exists, as vexatious40 to such an extent as may warrant reversal of con-
viction. "
463 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS, at 11-12 (1970).
464 United States v. Ervin, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 97, 98, 42 C.M.R. 289, 290 (1970); J. Fer-
guson, though concurring, would have dismissed because of "inordinate delay." Id. at 99, 42
•C.M.R. at 291.
465 United States v. Davis, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 541, 542, 43 C.M.R. 381, 382 (1971), citing
,United States v. Prater, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 339, 43 C.M.R. 179 (1971).
466 United States v. Bielecki, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 450, 452, 45 C.M.R. 224 (1972).
*467 United States v. Mason, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 389, 45 C.M.R. 163 (1972).
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